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To Whom Dare We Entrust Corporate Governance?
Capitalism at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century is a variegated
collection of economic systems. In America, capitalismis a system where a
huge number of independent corporations compete with each other for
customers. Monopolies are illegal, though the courts are sometimes an im-
perfect safeguard against them. Each corporation has a chief executive
oﬃcer (CEO) who dictates corporate policies and strategies to a largely
passive board of directors. The true owners of America’s great corpora-
tions, millions of middle-class shareholders, each owning a few hundred or
a few thousand shares, are disorganized and generally powerless. Only a
handful of institutional investors accumulate large stakes—3 or even 5
percent of an occasional large ﬁrm’s stock—that give them voices loud
enough to carry into corporate boardrooms. Corporate CEOs use or abuse
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cial, and economic beliefs. In much of the rest of the world, capitalism is a
system where a handful of immensely wealthy families control almost all of
a country’s great corporations, and often its government to boot. Compe-
tition is largely a mirage, for few ﬁrms are genuinely independent. Profes-
sional managers are hired help, subservient to oligarchic family dynasties
that jealously safeguard their power, sometimes at great cost to their host
economies.
The purpose of this volume is to explore how capitalism came to mean,
and to be, such diﬀerent things in diﬀerent parts of the world. How did
some economies come to entrust the governance of their great corpora-
tions to a handful of old moneyed families, while others place their faith in
professional CEOs?
Such diﬀerent usages of the word capitalism make for diﬃcult commu-
nication. American economists are often baﬄed by the reluctance of seem-
ingly well-educated foreigners to embrace the tenets of free enterprise, and
foreign economists marvel at the naive simplicity of their American col-
leagues. In fact, each would do well to take the other more seriously. The
rest of the world is not simply like America, but usually poorer to varying
degrees. Diﬀerent countries’ economies are organized in very diﬀerent
ways, and corporate governance—that is, decisions about how capital is
allocated, both across and within ﬁrms—is entrusted to very diﬀerent sorts
of people and constrained by very diﬀerent institutions.
A key study that forces this point upon the economics profession is by
La Porta et al. (1999), who contrast the ownership of large and medium-
sized companies across countries. Figure 1 illustrates their ﬁndings.1 The
central message of ﬁgure 1 is how very diﬀerent diﬀerent countries are. The
large corporate sector of Mexico is entirely controlled by a few enormously
wealthy families, whereas all the largest British companies get by with no
controlling shareholders at all. Most Argentine ﬁrms are controlled by
wealthy families, but most great American corporations are not. Wealthy
family domination of great corporations is not restricted to poor countries
but also characterizes relatively rich economies like Israel, Hong Kong,
and Sweden.
Nonetheless, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Khanna and Riv-
kin (2001), and many others document the ubiquity of family-controlled
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1. La Porta et al. (1999) list several large German and Japanese ﬁrms as having no control-
ling shareholder. However, because German banks typically vote the shares of small in-
vestors, Baums (1995) shows that these ﬁrms are actually controlled by banks. All the large
Japanese ﬁrms La Porta et al. list as having no controlling shareholder are members of cor-
porate groups called keiretsu,in which each ﬁrm is controlled collectively by other ﬁrms in the
group. Although each group ﬁrm’s stake in every other group ﬁrm can be small, these stakes
accumulate to control blocks. Figure 1 is based on La Porta et al. for all other countries. We
are grateful to Raphael La Porta for making the names of the top ﬁrms in each country avail-
able to us.Fig. 1 Who controls the world’s great corporations?
Sources: La Porta et al. (1999) with Japanese data augmented by Morck and Nakamura
(1999) to account for combined keiretsu stakes and German data augmented with informa-
tion from Baums (1995) to account for bank proxy voting.
Notes: Fraction of top ten ﬁrms with diﬀerent types of controlling shareholders is shown for
each country. Control is assumed if any shareholder or group of shareholders believed to work
in consort controls 20 percent of the votes in a company’s annual shareholder meeting.corporate groups in poor countries. In general, poor economies have cor-
porate sectors controlled by some mixture of state organs and wealthy fam-
ilies. The variety illustrated in ﬁgure 1 is primarily a feature of the devel-
oped world.
The fact that most large U.K. and U.S. ﬁrms are widely held, while most
large ﬁrms elsewhere are controlled by a few wealthy families, is perhaps
insuﬃcient to explain the diﬀerent perceptions of capitalism that hold
force in diﬀerent countries, for independent ﬁrms that compete with each
other still lead to economic eﬃciency regardless of who controls them.
However, a second feature of corporate governance in most countries, the
pyramidal business group or pyramid for short, magniﬁes the economic im-
portance of this diﬀerence enough to create genuinely diﬀerent economic
systems, all of which go by the name of capitalism.
A pyramid is a structure in which an apex shareholder, usually a very
wealthy family, controls a single company, which may or may not be listed.
This company then holds control blocks in other listed companies. Each of
these holds control blocks in yet more listed companies, and each of these
controls yet more listed companies. Structures such as these are ubiquitous
outside the United Kingdom and United States. They can contain dozens
or hundreds of ﬁrms, listed and private, and put vast sweeps of a nation’s
economy under the control of a single family. These are the structures that
permit tiny elites to control the greater parts of the corporate sectors of
many countries.
Berle and Means (1932), Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000),
Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang
(2000), and many others demonstrate the severe corporate governance
problems that can occur in pyramidal business groups. However, these
problems are only of interest in this volume to the extent that they motivate
the formation of business groups, or their dissolution. Our focus is on how
the diﬀerences in corporate control illustrated in ﬁgure 1 came to be.
The remainder of this chapter is laid out as follows: section 2 explains
why the diﬀerences outlined in ﬁgure 1 matter. Indeed, they are the key dis-
tinguishing features that deﬁne diﬀerent forms of capitalism. Section 3
then brieﬂy describes the key arguments and ﬁndings of each chapter. Sec-
tion 4 then sorts through these ﬁndings, highlighting common threads that
connect to current thinking about corporate governance. Section 4 goes on
to consider the implications of these threads, and section 5 provides a sum-
mary.
Does It Matter?
Capitalism is thus called because it is an economic system organized
around the production and allocation of capital. The savings of individu-
als are the basis of all capital. Yet the ways in which economies accumulate
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closely related to how each country handles corporate governance issues.
Individuals can save by investing in corporate stocks and bonds. Com-
panies they view as good bets can raise huge amounts of money by issuing
securities—as when Google raised $1.67 billion by selling new shares to the
public in 2004.2 A company that investors feel is a poor bet has diﬃculty
raising any substantial amount by issuing securities. For instance, the
Internet-based sales intermediary deja.com withdrew from its proposed
share issue in 2000, after it became clear that investors were not likely to
pay the sort of price management hoped for.3
If investors know what they are doing, capital is allocated to ﬁrms that
can use it well and is kept away from ﬁrms that are likely to waste it. This
process underlies shareholder capitalism, as practiced in the United King-
dom and United States. Firms in those countries that can issue stock and
bonds to investors acquire funds to build factories, buy machinery, and de-
velop technologies.
For investors to trust a company enough to buy its securities, they need
reassurance that the company will be run both honestly and cleverly. This
is where corporate governance is critical. The corporate governance of
large corporations in these countries is entrusted to CEOs and other pro-
fessional managers. Investors collectively monitor the quality of gover-
nance of each listed ﬁrm, and its share price reﬂects their consensus.
This system has costs. Monitoring the quality of corporate governance
in every ﬁrm in the economy eats up resources. American and British cap-
ital markets and regulators try to shift this cost away from investors by
mandating that ﬁrms disclose detailed ﬁnancial reports, insider share hold-
ings, management pay, and any conﬂicts of interest. Other rules proscribe
stock manipulation, certain trading, and other self-dealing by corporate
insiders. Shareholders can sue the directors and oﬃcers of any company
that violates these rules. These prohibitions aim to help investors by adding
regulatory and judicial oversight to the mix. And raiders and institutional
investors stand ready to toss out managers who seem either inept or dis-
honest. These deep-pocketed investors can aﬀord to bear a disproportion-
ate share of the cost of monitoring corporate governance and of cleaning
up governance problems when they arise.
This system is certainly imperfect. Good managers are penalized and
poor ones rewarded if investors get things wrong, and this seems to happen
with some regularity, as during the dot.com boom of 1999 when investors
bought Internet-related company shares with apparently irrational en-
thusiasm. But over the longer term, through the ebbs and rises of the busi-
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2. See “Google’s Stock Oﬀering Didn’t Follow Script,” Billings Gazette, 20 August 2004.
3. See “After failed IPO, Deja.Com Attempts to Reanimate,” by Jason Chervokas, 
atNewYork.com, 4 February 2000.ness cycle, Anglo-American capitalism seems to deliver high standards of
living.
But Anglo-American shareholder capitalism is exceptional. Other sys-
tems predominate, and La Porta et al. (1999) ﬁnd that the most common
system of corporate governance in the world is family capitalism, in which
the governance of a country’s large corporations is entrusted to its wealth-
iest few families. This situation might arise if investors are deeply mis-
trustful of most companies and prefer to invest by entrusting their savings
to persons of good reputation. Family ﬁrms constitute larger fractions of
the stock markets of countries that provide investors with fewer legal
rights. Respected business families can leverage their reputations by con-
trolling many listed companies, and by having listed companies they hold
control blocks of other listed companies, in successive tiers of intercorpo-
rate ownership. Such pyramidal business groups are also more common
where investors’ legal rights are weaker.
Yet family capitalism also has its problems. Corporate governance in
many countries is remarkably concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy
families. Governance can deteriorate over a wide swathe of the economy if
the patriarch, or heir, controlling a large business group grows inept, ex-
cessively conservative, or overly protective of the status quo. Since the sta-
tus quo clearly has advantages to these families, the last possibility is es-
pecially disquieting. For example, they might lobby to keep shareholder
rights weak so that upstarts cannot compete for public investors’ savings.
Another way investors can save is by putting money in a bank or other
ﬁnancial institution. The bank then lends the money to companies to buy
factories, machinery, and technologies. Or sometimes the bank actually in-
vests in other companies by buying their shares or bonds. This constitutes
another way in which economies can accumulate and allocate capital.
Banks play much greater capital allocation roles in German and Japanese
capitalism than in the Anglo-American variant, although, as Morck and
Nakamura (1999) and Fohlin (chap. 4 in this volume) show, their role may
have been somewhat overstated in both countries.
Inbank capitalism,oversight by bankers substitutes for shareholder dili-
gence. Bankers monitor the governance of other ﬁrms and intervene to
correct governance mistakes. If errant managers refuse to change their
ways, banks withhold credit, starving the misgoverned ﬁrm of capital. As
long as the bankers are altruistic and competent, this system can allocate
capital eﬃciently.However, if a few key banks are themselves misgoverned,
the ramiﬁcations are much worse and can create problems across all the
ﬁrms that depend on that bank for capital. Bank capitalism delivered solid
growth in postwar Germany and Japan, and in emerging economies like
Korea. But in all three, overenthusiastic lending by a few top bankers to
misgoverned ﬁrms created ﬁnancial problems that continue to hinder
macroeconomic growth.
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provide capital to businesses. In its extreme form, this is the guiding prin-
ciple of socialism. But industrial policies—state-guided capital accumula-
tion and allocation—are important in many free-market economies as
well, especially historically. For example, the Fascist governments of Ger-
many, Italy, and Japan all imposed this form of corporate governance upon
virtually all their large corporations. More democratically formulated in-
dustrial policies played large roles in the economies of Canada, Japan, In-
dia, and all major continental European economies, as well as in many
emerging-market economies. Nationalized industries in mid-twentieth-
century Britain and massive defense and public works investments in the
United States also count as industrial policies.
Instate capitalism,public oﬃcials supervise corporate managers and in-
tervene to correct any governance problems. If the bureaucratic overseers
are able and altruistic, they can direct corporate decision making down
paths that promote the general good. But intractable governance problems
arise if the public oﬃcials have inadequate ability or knowledge to make
such decisions or if they skew decisions to beneﬁt politically favored per-
sons or groups. State capitalism delivered brief periods of high growth in
many countries, but it seems prone to serious governance problems of these
sorts over the longer run.
Finally, investors can save by hoarding gold and silver coins. If people
mistrust ﬁnancial markets, wealthy families, bankers, and politicians, this
may be the only option left. Murphy (chap. 3 in this volume) argues that a
series of ﬁnancial scandals and crises in France actually did reduce gener-
ations of Frenchmen to burying coins in their yards to provide for their fu-
tures, and that this mistrust retarded French ﬁnancial development se-
verely. When the savings of the broader public are unavailable to business,
each company must grow using its earnings alone. This automatically al-
locates additional capital to those who already control companies, which
is unlikely to be economically eﬃcient. It also makes getting started very
diﬃcult for impecunious entrepreneurs.
Of course, no country is a pure example of any of these ﬂavors of capi-
talism. Each variant of capitalism accounts for part of the capital forma-
tion in all the countries covered in this book. But the diﬀerent variants
clearly have diﬀerent relative importance—both across countries and over
time—and these diﬀerences are of great moment. Entrusting corporate
governance to wealthy families, a few powerful bankers, or a cadre of bu-
reaucrats might seem profoundly undemocratic to some. Entrusting it to
anyone but civil servants, chosen by elected oﬃcials, might seem undemo-
cratic to others. And entrusting corporate governance to anyone but rep-
utable leading families might seem rashly irresponsible to still others.
Moreover, as the chapters of this book show, impersonal stock markets,
banks, wealthy families, and government bureaucrats each arise from
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of issues to the fore.
Why Did Diﬀerent Countries Follow Diﬀerent Paths?
This volume contains one chapter describing the history of corporate
governance in each member country in the Group of Seven (G7) of leading
industrialized nations: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. To these we add a chapter on the Nether-
lands, because it is the oldest capitalist economy, and many of the institu-
tions that determine corporate control elsewhere originated there. We also
add a chapter on Sweden because it is the standard bearer of an alternative
Swedish modelof capitalism tempered by social democracy. Finally, we add
a chapter each on India and China—the world’s two largest developing
economies. This list is incomplete—omitting such important countries as
Australia, Russia, Spain, and Switzerland, not to mention much of Asia
and all of Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. It is our hope that
other students of corporate ﬁnance or economic history will ﬁll in these
gaps.
Early stages of the research that led to this volume showed that the ﬁrst
large corporations almost everywhere were family businesses, and that
family ﬁrms predominate in most countries whose industrial histories are
short. We therefore chose the countries enumerated above not because we
believe they are more important, but because they all have reasonably long
histories as industrial economies. Countries whose industrial histories go
back only a generation or two, such as Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore,
provide insuﬃcient time for the forces that change corporate governance
to act. While these countries are profoundly interesting from many per-
spectives, they are less able to provide insight into the evolution of corpo-
rate control than older industrial economies.
The authors of each study were invited to write a historical account of
the evolution of control over their assigned country’s large ﬁrms. The focus
is primarily on large ﬁrms, for small ﬁrms everywhere tend to have con-
trolling shareholders. Mom-and-pop stores in India, Italy, and the United
States all tend to be owned by mom and pop. The diﬀerent connotations of
capitalism that spice political debates in diﬀerent countries so diﬀerently
are mainly due to diﬀerences in who controls countries’ large corporations.
This section now summarizes the key results of each chapter. The next
section condenses these ﬁndings into a general account of how corporate
governance diverged as it did.
Canada
In chapter 1, Morck, Percy, Tian, and Yeung describe Canada’s pre-
industrial history—ﬁrst as a French colony of resource extraction built
8 Randall K. Morck and Lloyd Steieraround the fur trade, and then as ﬁrst a French and then a British colony
of settlement. Their theme is how the institutions built up during these
colonial periods aﬀected Canada’s subsequent industrial development.
This study has two key points. The ﬁrst is that Canada was a remarkably
corrupt country until a few generations ago. Canada inherited from her
French colonial history a disposition to mercantilist policies that invite
oﬃcial abuse. Indeed, the country was a veritable laboratory for Jean Bap-
tiste Colbert, the father of French mercantilism. Subsequent British and
Canadian elites preserved this disposition in the Canadian government,
economy, and culture.
Their second key point is a remarkable pattern in Canadian corporate
control. A full century ago, the large corporate sector looked much as it
does now: a slight predominance of family-controlled pyramidal business
groups supplemented by a large phalanx of freestanding widely held ﬁrms.
However, half a century ago, the Canadian large corporate sector was com-
posed mainly of freestanding widely held ﬁrms.
Through the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, wealthy Canadian fami-
lies sold out into stock market booms, went bankrupt during recessions,
diluted their stakes by issuing stock to fund takeovers, and liquidated cor-
porate empires to pay estate taxes. The net eﬀect was a marked eclipse of
family control and pyramids. By the mid-twentieth century, Canada
looked much like the United States does in Figure 1. Then, in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, pyramidal groups resurged, and they had regained their
gilded-age proportions by the century’s end. The reasons for this are not
fully clear. The authors speculate that an emasculation of the estate tax and
a dramatic expansion of state intervention in the economy may have been
factors. The erosion of the estate tax permitted large fortunes to survive
and grow. Government intervention made political connections more
valuable corporate assets than in the past, and pyramidal business groups
may have been better than freestanding, widely held, and professionally
managed ﬁrms at building and exploiting such connections.
Siegal’s discussion of this chapter introduces an especially insightful
division of institutional development into three stages. First come insti-
tutions, such as universal education, necessary for the production of en-
trepreneurial ideas. Then come institutions, such as ﬁnancial systems,
necessary to realize these ideas. Finally come institutions, such as public
policy regarding inheritances, that prevent one period’s entrepreneurs
from entrenching themselves and blocking entrepreneurship by others.
China
Chapter 2, by Goetzmann and Köll, examines Chinese corporate gover-
nance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This period is of
interest because it corresponds to the beginning of China’s industrializa-
tion and sees the attempted transplanting of Western institutions into a
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may thus oﬀer more interesting lessons for modern emerging economies
than does post-communist China, scraped clear of its non-Western tradi-
tions by decades of totalitarian Marxism. Certainly, for China herself, pre-
revolutionary capitalism also provides a model of a “market economy with
Chinese characteristics.”
Late nineteenth-century China’s ﬁrst generation of industrial ﬁrms
ﬂoated equity yet remained under state control. Modeled on the imperial
salt monopoly, these ventures were ﬁnanced and operated by private mer-
chants, but ultimately controlled by imperial bureaucrats. Intended to re-
assert China’s pride and prestige, they sought to free China of foreign arms
makers, shippers, and manufacturers. Industrialization was a means to this
end, and to restoring China’s traditional economic balance, but not an end
in itself.
Imperial bureaucrats were accustomed to buying and selling oﬃces and
favors. Proﬁtable businesses thus attracted more intensive bureaucratic
oversight, and their earnings were quickly bled away. Although bureau-
cratic intervention protected these ﬁrms from competition, their merchant
investors and managers became increasingly dissatisﬁed with the fees and
bribes their civil service overlords demanded.
Having lost the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the imperial government
was forced to permit private foreign industry in treaty ports, which were
subject to foreign law, and so could no longer prevent Chinese from estab-
lishing private industrial ﬁrms. New industrial businesses proliferated rap-
idly.
To regulate these, the imperial government enacted a new Corporations
Law in 1904. An abbreviated version of contemporary English and Japan-
ese law, it permitted limited liability and mandated shareholder meetings,
elected boards, auditors, and detailed annual reports. Shares had traded in
Shanghai since the 1860s, and equity participation was a long-established
business principle. The 1904 code was thus a top-down revision of estab-
lished practices, not a de novo introduction of business corporations. Its
main innovation was the replacement of oﬃcial patronage by a rules-based
code of conduct designed to attract investment by public shareholders.
It was remarkably ineﬀective. Goetzmann and Köll examine a large in-
dustrial concern, Dasheng No. 1 Cotton Mill, to see how the 1904 law al-
tered its governance and ﬁnd virtually no eﬀect. The founder and general
manager, Zhang Jian, continued intermingling company and personal
funds, ignored shareholder criticism of his donations of company money
to political causes, and could not be removed because the corporate char-
ter contained numerous provisions protecting his power. The absence of
standard accounting rules made the disclosed ﬁnancial accounts of mini-
mal use.
The reasons beneath this failure are not fully clear. Perhaps cultural in-
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paying for the patronage of imperial bureaucrats proved too deeply in-
grained. But the top-down reformers also saw capital markets only as
sources of funds, overlooking their use as mechanisms for disciplining er-
rant corporate insiders. Portfolio investors, unable to inﬂuence corporate
governance after the fact, moved out of stocks. This kept the Chinese stock
market illiquid and subject to severe boom-and-bust cycles. This, in turn,
kept insiders from selling out and diversifying, underscoring the value of
their private beneﬁts of control.
In his discussion of this chapter, Perkins argues that China’s traditional
legal system was also an important factor. By empowering each county’s
magistrates as representative of the central government, judge, and prose-
cutor, this system prevented the disinterested enforcement of any laws,
no matter how well written. Perkins stresses that the real lesson modern
emerging economies should take from pre-Communist Chinese economic
history is the critical importance of an independent and trustworthy judi-
ciary.
France
The chapter on France by Murphy (chap. 3) stresses the importance of
history. Its theme is that historical trauma generates strong aftershocks
that aﬀect the economy for generations, shaping the collective psyche to
constrain the course of subsequent events. This chapter is an eloquent re-
statement of “path dependence”—the thesis that a simple historical acci-
dent can set the economy on one of many previously equally probable
paths.
The shock that set the course of future French corporate governance was
the implosion of the Mississippi Company in 1720. John Law (1671–1729),
a Scottish convicted murderer, rescued France from the ﬁnancial ruin
wrought by the wars and court extravagance of Louis XIV. Law’s Com-
pagnie de l’Occident took on all French government debt in return for a
monopoly on trade with Louisiana. Law’s company issued shares and
hyped their value, stimulating investment demand, which pushed their
value up further, stimulating even more demand.
This bubble imploded in 1720, ruining the ﬁnances not only of the
French kingdom but of much of her aristocracy and merchant elite. Joint
stock companies were banned, and wise Frenchmen shunned ﬁnancial
markets and passed this wisdom on to their children.
The South Sea Company, a deliberate imitation of Law’s French experi-
ment in Britain, burst at about the same time and to somewhat the same
eﬀect. The Bubble Act of 1722 banned joint stock companies in Britain un-
less they secured a parliamentary charter. This meant that establishing
each new joint stock company required an act of Parliament. The London
Stock Exchange survived because preexisting sound British companies,
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were grandfathered.
The reaction in France was much more severe—a profound rejection of
banks, credit, and ﬁnancial innovation and a retreat to the traditional
French ﬁnancial system, regulated by religious directives, which controlled
methods of borrowing and lending, with the state constituting the main
borrower. Religious prohibitions against interest meant that contracts had
to separate the ownership of savings from the streams of revenue they pro-
duced. The notaries who drew up these contracts became surrogate
bankers, but only in a very limited sense. While they arranged for the state
to borrow by issuing annuities, Murphy argues that their role in ﬁnancing
the private sector was mainly limited to mortgages for real estate pur-
chases. While they had some leeway around the usury laws, the notaries
were unable to arrange the sorts of high-interest speculative debt appro-
priate to ﬁnance an industrial revolution. British companies needed par-
liamentary approval to issue shares, but French businesses had even more
diﬃculty issuing shares, had no access to debt in the ordinary sense, and
had to get by without a formal banking system.
In October 1789, the revolutionary government repealed the usury laws
and resurrected Law’s economic system, now issuing assignats. The only
real diﬀerence was that these securities were backed by seized church es-
tates, rather than a monopoly on trade with Louisiana. John Law was a
central topic in the National Assembly debates. Murphy describes how the
Abbé Maury produced a ﬁstful of Law’s banknotes, denouncing them as
“ﬁctive pledges of an immense and illusory capital, which I drew from a
huge depot where they have been held for the instruction of posterity. With
sorrow I look at these paper instruments of so many crimes, I see them still
covered with the tears and blood of our fathers and I oﬀer them today to
the representatives of the French nation as beacons placed on the reefs so
as to perpetuate the memory of this massive shipwreck.”
Maury was ignored, and the Revolutionary government issued ever
more assignats to cover its escalating expenses. France soon experienced
full-blown hyperinﬂation and ﬁnancial collapse. Kindleberger (1984,
p. 99) writes that assignats “embedded paranoia about paper money and
banks more deeply in the French subconscious.”
The hyperinﬂation nourished the popular distrust of ﬁnance that Law
had sown, and the French public took to hoarding gold and silver. Through
most of the nineteenth century, most transactions were in specie, and coins
still composed more than half of the money supply in 1885.
The French banking system was reinvigorated with the rise of the Crédit
Mobilier, a universal bank established by Emile and Isaac Pereire, inspired
by the utopian socialist ideals of Claude-Henri, comte de Saint-Simon,
who saw banks as irrigation systems to bring capital from areas of over-
abundance to areas of drought. Hobbled by a portfolio of disastrous in-
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French and European banking system down with it, and wise Frenchmen
continued hoarding gold and silver coins.
The Paris bourse would occasionally achieve brief periods of activity in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but it would never again
rival the economic importance of the London Stock Exchange. Kindle-
berger (1984, p. 113) estimates that “France lagged behind Britain in ﬁnan-
cial institutions and experience by a hundred years or so.”
French businesses expanded, using the retained earnings of one com-
pany to build others, and the founding families of these business groups re-
mained in control generation after generation. French Civil Law facilitated
this course by making it virtually impossible for the owner of a business to
bequeath it to anyone but his children. French tycoons with families can-
not leave their fortunes to charitable foundations. Landes (1949) argues
that France fell behind Britain because a preponderance of family control
made large French corporations more conservative and reliant on govern-
ment connections.
Severe ﬁnancial trauma thus set France on a course of economic devel-
opment that left wealthy families controlling her corporate sector under
the watchful guidance of the state. Psychologists have only the vaguest un-
derstanding of why a similar trauma shatters some individuals’ lives and
barely aﬀects others. Economists, likewise, need a deeper understanding of
how economic trauma shapes institutional development. Murphy’s chap-
ter is a ﬁrst step in that direction.
Daniel Raﬀ, in his discussion of this chapter, raises a series of penetrat-
ing questions arising from Murphy’s central ideas, and argues that we need
much additional work along these lines.
Germany
In chapter 4, Fohlin argues that Germany’s large universal banks were
less important to its history of corporate governance than is commonly be-
lieved. German industrialization advanced rapidly in the late nineteenth
century, ﬁnanced by wealthy merchant families, foreign investors, small
shareholders, and private banks. Industrial ﬁrms with bankers on their
boards did not perform better than other ﬁrms.
German corporate governance appears thoughtfully developed in this
era. The Company Law of 1870 created the current dual-board structure
explicitly to protect small shareholders and the public from self-serving in-
siders. It also required greater uniformity and consistency in accounting,
reporting, and governance. The Company Law of 1884 proscribed sitting
on the same company’s supervisory and management boards and thrust a
“duty to become informed” on supervisory board directors. In the two
decades before World War I, managerial turnover was highly sensitive to
ﬁrm performance, suggesting that some form of disciplinary governance
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were most likely to be owned mainly by public shareholders, rather than
founding families or other block holders, replaced management even more
readily in response to poor performance.
German universal banks’ proxy-voting powers arose from their role in
placing new securities and in lending with shares as collateral. The Com-
pany Law of 1884 required a minimum turnout at a company’s ﬁrst share-
holders meeting, and banks could accomplish this by holding proxies for
small shareholders. Banks thus ended up voting the shares of companies
that used their underwriting services. The Company Law of 1897 made ex-
change trading cumbersome, and this apparently moved share trading in-
side the big banks.
Under the Weimar Republic, ownership seems to have grown more dis-
persed, instilling fears of corporate takeovers in both founding families
and their hired managers. To prevent such events, multiple voting shares
and voting caps came into widespread usage.4 Multiple voting shares were
often bestowed on family members serving on supervisory boards and on
the family’s bank. Voting caps cap nonfamily shareholders’ voting rights
regardless of their actual ownership. Pyramids do not seem to have gained
prominence, perhaps because these other devices permitted ﬁrms to tap
public equity markets for capital without risking takeovers.
The National Socialist government established much of the modern
foundations of German corporate governance. Invoking the Führerprinzip
or leader principle, the Nazis’ Shareholder Law of 1937 freed corporate
managers and directors of their speciﬁc ﬁduciary duty to shareholders and
substituted a general duty to all stakeholders—especially to the Reich. It
banned voting by mail, and forced shareholders who could not vote in per-
son to register their holdings with banks and entrust banks with proxy vot-
ing rights. This bestowed the large banks with voting control over much of
the German large corporate sector. The Reich then took control of the
banks.
Following the war, the banks were privatized, but the Nazi innovations
of stakeholder rights and proxy voting by banks remained. Codetermina-
tion gave workers half the supervisory board, though Roe (2002) argues
that companies simply shifted decisions out of the supervisory boards. Re-
forms in 1965 abolished the Führerprinzip, required banks to have written
permission to vote proxies, and required that banks inform shareholders of
how they voted. Shareholders could be anonymous again. Reforms in 1998
abolished voting caps, and the stock prices of aﬀected companies rose
sharply. Multiple voting shares remained unimportant.
Pyramiding apparently arose mainly after WWII. German households’
ownership of shares declined sharply, from 48.6 percent of all shares in
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4. Though Dunlavy (2004) argues for a much earlier provenance.1950 to 17 percent in 1996. Meanwhile, intercorporate equity blocks rose
from 18 percent in 1950 to 41 percent in 1996. The use of pyramids is far
more extensive in the last few decades of the twentieth century than before.
With multiple voting shares banned, pyramids may have become the pre-
ferred mechanism for retaining control while also using public sharehold-
ers’ money.
The modern German economy thus consists primarily of family-
controlled pyramidal groups and nominally widely held ﬁrms that are ac-
tually controlled by the top few banks via proxies. The leading banks col-
lectively also control dominant blocks of their own shares. Bank voting
control is less evident in smaller ﬁrms, which tend to have family control
blocks. Recent reforms require banks to inform shareholders of their right
to vote their own shares annually and to erect Chinese Walls around staﬀ
who decide how to vote at shareholder meetings.
Fohlin argues that patterns of corporate control in Germany are best ex-
plained by “a string of disastrous political institutions and movements in
the aftermath of World War I, culminating in the Nazi regime, dismantled
the rich, highly functioning, hybrid ﬁnancial system of the Second Reich.
The postwar political and legal climate, one that continues to suppress the
liberal tradition of the pre–World War I era, seemingly prevents the old
dual system from reemerging.”
Dyck’s discussion commends Fohlin for documenting the aborted dis-
persion of German shareholdings, but argues that a complete explanation
needs further work. Dyck is unswayed by arguments diminishing the role
of banks in German corporate governance, and argues that Germany’s
economic success warrants further study of how German ﬁrms avoid clas-
sic governance traps.
India
Chapter 5, by Khanna and Palepu, highlights India’s long business his-
tory. Large-scale trading networks of merchants belonging to particular
ethnic and sectarian groups go back centuries, and modern Indian busi-
ness groups often correspond to these same groupings. When India began
industrializing under the British Raj, these groups had the capital both to
compete and to cooperate with Indian subsidiaries of the great British
business groups of the era.
The Tata family, of priestly Parsi origin, controlled the largest business
group in India for the past sixty years. The group grew to prominence un-
der the Raj, nurtured by colonial government contracts and protected by
imperial tariﬀs. The Tatas were neutral on independence, and so they lost
favor when the Congress party took charge.
The Birla family, of the prosperous Marwari community, ﬁnanced Mo-
handas Gandhi and the Congress party generously. Khanna and Palepu
quote Sarojini Naidu, a Congress activist and poet, who quipped, “It took
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free.” The Birla group expanded dramatically in the postindependence pe-
riod and by 1969 was the second largest Indian business group.
Thus, the early histories of India’s two greatest business groups align
with two theses of Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) and Khanna (2000): that
such groups excel at doing deals with politicians and attain their position
through political connections, and that they confer genuine economic ad-
vantages. Khanna and Palepu’s ﬁnding that group ﬁrms are typically older
and larger than independent ﬁrms is consistent with both.
Khanna and Palepu’s key point is that the rankings of smaller Indian
business groups are quite volatile, with groups appearing, rising, falling,
and disappearing. Turnover around independence doubtless reﬂects the
withdrawal from India of British business groups such as Martin Burn,
Andrew Yule, and Inchcape. But volatility actually increases after inde-
pendence, clearly showing that business groups did not always entrench
their owners’ economic positions. Such volatility speaks of a more entre-
preneurial economy than is generally credited to postindependence India.
Thus, business groups as an organizational form persisted, but many in-
dividual business groups, especially smaller ones, did not. In the 1960s,
Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru led India down a distinctly socialist
path, building a dense thicket of regulation and bureaucratic oversight
that came to be called the License Raj. Nehru’s original motive seems to
have been a desire to curb the power of India’s large business groups fol-
lowing a series of oﬃcial reports that documented evidence of big business
houses exerting signiﬁcant inﬂuence over the economy and exploiting
growth opportunities through favorable access to ﬁnance and government
permits. Nehru’s daughter, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, asserted even
greater state control over private-sector ﬁrms’ pursuit of growth opportu-
nities, access to ﬁnance, and collaboration with foreign partners and
forced many multinational companies out of the country. This policy
proved economically disastrous, and a period of slow deregulation began
in the mid-1980s. A ﬁnancial crisis spurred a much more radical liberal-
ization in the 1990s.
Turnover among smaller business groups during all of this might indi-
cate an entrepreneurial economy, in which innovative new businesses arise
and old ones die out. Khanna and Palepu argue that business groups re-
tained an advantage over individual ﬁrms throughout because they could
better bridge institutional gaps—like dysfunctional capital, labor, and
product markets. But these beneﬁts certainly accrue mostly to very large
business groups. Smaller ones containing only a few ﬁrms cannot avoid
markets as well as huge groups containing larger reservoirs of capital, la-
bor, and products of all kinds that can be allocated internally.
But the larger groups also devoted huge resources, establishing de facto
embassies in New Delhi staﬀed by legions of experts in all manner of bu-
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the great business groups, but its actual eﬀect may have been the opposite.
Only the largest groups could absorb the huge ﬁxed cost of retaining the
bureaucratic expertise needed to navigate the maze.
Under Indira Gandhi, the Birla group was accused of manipulating the
licensing system. Stung by this unexpected criticism, the Birlas shifted
their expansion plans overseas. Given India’s strict foreign exchange con-
trols at the time, this surely required oﬃcial acquiescence. A string of prof-
itable overseas subsidiaries put substantial group cash ﬂows well beyond
the reach of the minions of New Delhi, enabling the group to expand rap-
idly within India once the License Raj was dismantled. One interpretation
of all this is that the size and prominence of the Birla group reﬂects their
entrepreneurial tendencies in handling the licensing restrictions, rather
than simple political rent seeking.
The Tatas felt discriminated against under the License Raj, and this may
well have been so. Nonetheless, they survived and prospered, and grew in-
creasingly entrepreneurial and innovative to compensate for their relative
lack of political inﬂuence. By remaining economically dominant, the Tata
group conﬁrms that government connections are but one factor underlying
the success of Indian businesses.
Ultimately, the chapter argues that large family business groups likely
persisted because they bridged institutional voids created by dysfunctional
markets and weak economic institutions. But even beyond this, the chap-
ter argues that the Tata group in particular survives and prospers because
of genuine entrepreneurship. They stress the role of the Tatas in developing
India’s software industry. This industry is thought to prosper precisely be-
cause it is less dependent on India’s creaking domestic institutions and
markets, so groups’ advantage in this sector should be minimal. Perhaps
the Tatas supply entrepreneurial activity and prosper because this is in
short supply in emerging economies like India.
Mody’s discussion of this chapter begins with a comparison of Korea,
whose development depended on large family-controlled business groups,
and Taiwan, whose development was mainly due to smaller ﬁrms. He
points out that both countries grew rapidly, but he suggests that Korean
groups eventually became a problem because they made entrepreneurship
by outsiders diﬃcult. Mody recounts the Bombay Plan, in which the lead-
ers of India’s most powerful business families “called on government sup-
port for industrialization, including a direct role for the government in the
production of capital goods, foreshadowing postindependence Indian
planning, typically considered an outgrowth of socialist ideas drawn either
from the Soviet Union or the so-called Fabian socialists.” He argues that
this plan, proposed just before independence, shows that its sponsors, in-
cluding the Tata and Birla families, did actively seek partnership with the
Congress party government they saw approaching.
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Chapter 6, by Aganin and Volpin, shows that family-controlled business
groups were more powerful in the middle of the century than at either end
of it, and that the stock market was more important at either end of the
century than at its midpoint.
Laws and politics clearly have some explanatory power. At the beginning
of the century, the Italian government had little interest in direct interven-
tion in the economy. However, all three major Italian investment banks
collapsed in 1931, and the Fascist government took on their holdings of
industrial shares and imposed a legal separation of investment from
commercial banking. The shares were turned over to the Istituto per la Ri-
construzione Italiana (IRI), which would persist as a large state-controlled
pyramidal group. After the Second World War, Italy’s governments main-
tained a direct role in the economy, propping up ﬁnancially troubled com-
panies and using its corporate governance power to direct economic
growth, especially in capital-intensive sectors. Postwar governments
founded the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) in 1952 to control ﬁrms in
the chemical, oil, and mining sectors; the Ente Partecippazioni e Finanzi-
amento Industrial Manifatturiera (EFIM) in 1962 to control electric and
other companies; and the Società di Gestioni e Partecipazioni Industriali
(GEPI) in 1972 to intervene in the Southern Italian economy. Each of these
business groups controlled numerous listed companies and was directed by
a forceful, politically appointed CEO.
Aganin and Volpin thus argue that, since postwar Italian politicians
opted to allocate capital via an industrial policy rather than via the ﬁnan-
cial system, they saw no great need for investor protection. Investors opted
for government bonds, rather than shares, and the Italian stock market
shrank steadily through the middle of the century. New entrants found
public share issues very expensive, while politicians assisted established
large business groups with cheap capital. New publicly traded family
groups emerged rarely, and always with strong political support. Most Ital-
ian ﬁrms remained unlisted and were operated by founding families in
small-scale niche markets.
This locked in a sort of state and family capitalism. Listed ﬁrms were
mostly organized into pyramidal groups controlled by either the state or
old families. The corporate governance of Italy’s large listed ﬁrms was thus
entrusted either to politically appointed bureaucrats or to wealthy old fam-
ilies who transmitted power from generation to generation.
Italy’s industrial policies directed subsidized capital to both sorts of
business groups, which raised public debt and taxes to unsustainable levels
by the 1990s. A sweeping privatization program and improved legal pro-
tection for public shareholders reinvigorated the stock market. Formerly
unlisted companies opted to go public, and the stock market grew further.
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nance, continue to demand stronger property rights protection.
Japan
The history of corporate governance in Japan is more complicated and
variegated than in any other major country. Consequently, chapter 7, by
Morck and Nakamura, takes the form of a narrative history more than do
many of the other contributions to this volume.
Prior to 1868, Japan was a deeply conservative and isolationist country.
Business families were at the bottom of a hereditary caste system—be-
neath priests, warriors, peasants, and craftsmen. Unsurprisingly, this
moral inversion led to stagnation. Yet the necessity of running a densely
populous country forced Japan’s feudal shoguns to give prominent mer-
cantile families, like the Mitsui and Sumitomo, steadily greater inﬂuence.
When Admiral Perry, in an early example of American unilateralism,
bombarded Tokyo until Japan opened her markets to American traders,
the shogun acquiesced and a cadre of rash young samurai warriors seized
power, justifying their coup as the restoration of the Meiji emperor, who
nonetheless remained a ﬁgurehead. The Meiji Restoration leaders planned
to defeat the foreigners and restore Japan’s splendid isolation, but they
soon realized that beating the foreigners meant learning their ways. The
Meiji leadership sent Japan’s best students to universities throughout the
world to learn about foreign technology, business, and governments, and
to report back. The result was a cultural, economic, and political reinven-
tion of Japan, in which the reformers cobbled together a new system based
on what they saw as global best practice in legal, economic, and social in-
stitutions. The government founded state-owned enterprises to bring all
manner of Western industry to Japan, and built up huge debts in the pro-
cess. To extricate itself, the Meiji government conducted a mass privatiza-
tion, in which most of these enterprises were sold to the Mitsui and Su-
mitomo families and to a few other family-controlled business groups that
were gaining prominence, such as Mitsubishi. These groups, called zai-
batsu, were family-controlled pyramids of listed corporations, much like
those found elsewhere in the world. Later, other groups like Nissan, a py-
ramidal business group with a widely held ﬁrm at its apex, joined in as
Japan’s economy roared into the twentieth century. Thus, Japan began its
industrialization with a mixture of family and state capitalism. Sharehold-
ers eagerly bought shares, especially in numerous subsidiaries ﬂoated by
these great business groups.
The 1920s and early 1930s were depressionary periods and exposed the
weaknesses and strengths of diﬀerent pyramidal structures. Groups like
the Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi pyramids, whose banks (or de facto
banks) were located near their apexes, survived. Groups like the Suzuki
pyramid, whose bank was controlled but not owned by the Suzuki family,
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family to transfer funds out of the bank and into ﬁrms whose ﬁnancial fate
aﬀected family wealth, and that this rendered such groups ﬁnancially un-
stable during downturns. The prolonged economic stagnation eroded the
public’s appreciation of family capitalism, and economic reformers lam-
basted the wealthy families for putting their rights as shareholders ahead
of the public interest and for their ﬁxation on short-term earnings and div-
idends rather than long-term investment.
In the 1930s, the military slowly consolidated power by strategically as-
sassinating civilian government leaders and replacing them with military
oﬃcers. Although Japan’s military government was decidedly fascist, its
economic policies borrowed unblushingly from Soviet practices. The gov-
ernment freed corporate boards of their duty to shareholders—meaning
the families and corporate large shareholders—and limited dividends.
Military representatives sat on all major boards and supervised the imple-
mentation of centrally directed production quotas. Prices and wages were
also determined by central planners. Although the de jure ownership rights
of Japanese shareholders were never formally annulled, the 1945 American
occupation force took charge of an economy not greatly diﬀerent from the
post-Socialist economies of Eastern Europe in the early 1990s.
The American occupation government, though led by General Mac-
Arthur, was staﬀed with Roosevelt “New Dealers.” As the chapter by Becht
and De Long shows, the Roosevelt administration had successfully forced
the dismantlement of America’s zaibatsu, the great family-controlled py-
ramidal groups that had previously dominated its economy. The New
Dealers resolved to do the same in Japan. Family and intercorporate equity
blocks were conﬁscated and sold to the public. The families received nom-
inal compensation in bonds, and the proceeds from the equity sales ac-
crued to the government. By 1952, Japan’s great corporations were almost
all freestanding and widely held, just as those of the United Kingdom and
United States are at present. Corporate raiders soon emerged and
launched two major waves of hostile takeovers of ﬁrms they viewed as mis-
governed. As in the United Kingdom and United States today, hostile
takeovers were only a small fraction of total merger activity, but they
aﬀected large ﬁrms and drew disproportionate publicity. As Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) stress, the threat of a hostile takeover is prob-
ably more important to promoting good governance than its occurrence.
But takeovers did not lead to the improved governance the raiders de-
sired. The professional managers now governing Japan’s great corpora-
tions were not constrained by regulations, laws, or customs to protect the
property rights of public shareholders. Initially, a popular takeover defense
was greenmail—the target ﬁrm’s managers would pay the raider (with
shareholders’ money) to back oﬀ. These payments likely only emphasized
the target ﬁrms’ poor governance to other potential raiders.
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In the United States, target ﬁrms sometimes obstruct a raider by placing a
block of stock with a friendly shareholder, called a white squire,or by bring-
ing in a rival acquirer, a white knight, whose management is friendly to the
target’s managers. The keiretsu defense, a variant along the same lines, in-
volves a group of ﬁrms run by mutually friendly managers exchanging
small blocks of stock with each other. Even though each ﬁrm holds only a
tiny stake in every other ﬁrm, these stakes collectively sum to eﬀective con-
trol blocks. Every ﬁrm in the keiretsu group is thus controlled collectively
by all the other ﬁrms in the group. Keiretsu groups arose in two waves, ﬁrst
in the 1950s and then in the 1960s. Japan’s experiment with Anglo-
American shareholder capitalism was short-lived, and the keiretsu system
remains in place today.
Although their primary functions were to lock in corporate control
rights, both zaibatsu and keiretsu were probably also rational responses to
a variety of institutional failings. Successful zaibatsu and keiretsu were en-
thusiastic political rent seekers, raising the possibility that large corporate
groups are better at inﬂuencing government than freestanding ﬁrms. In the
case of some zaibatsu and many keiretsu, this rent seeking probably re-
tarded ﬁnancial development. This, and the probable misallocation of sub-
stantial amounts of capital by poorly governed keiretsu ﬁrms, appears to
have created long-term economic problems that slowed Japan’s growth
through the 1990s.
Sheldon Garon’s discussion argues that more attention should be paid to
precisely who made which decisions in importing Western institutions. He
also points out that little is said in the chapter about small and medium-
sized ﬁrms, despite their importance. He also takes issue with the view that
Tokugawa Japan isolated itself from the rest of the world and that Japan’s
wartime economy resembled Soviet central planning. He points out that
recent thinking stresses Tokugawa Japan’s contacts via foreigners in Na-
gasaki and rightly argues that wartime Japan imitated National Socialist
central planning, which is described in detail in the chapter by Fohlin. We
recognize this but remain impressed by the remarkable similarity of Na-
tional Socialist, Fascist, and Soviet socialist central planning, as described
by Silverman (1998), Guerin (1945), and Hosking (1985), respectively,
among others.
The Netherlands
The Netherlands has the oldest stock market in the world, and its entre-
preneurs largely invented the joint-stock corporation. Chapter 8, in which
de Jong and Röell discuss the history of corporate governance in the
Netherlands, is therefore especially enlightening. The world’s ﬁrst great
limited-liability, widely held, joint-stock company, the Dutch East Indies
Company, or Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, was founded in 1602.
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1622, when the managers, who had ﬂoated the stock as participation in a
limited-term partnership with a liquidating dividend in twenty years, de-
cided to keep the “astonishingly lucrative” enterprise continuing indeﬁ-
nitely. The investors were outraged, but the government of the Dutch Re-
public saw the company as a weapon in its conﬂicts with Spain and
supported management. The dividend stream was large enough that in-
vestors who wanted out could sell their shares to others. This was perhaps
better than a liquidating dividend since the seller need not wait for the com-
pany’s ﬁxed lifetime to expire. Nonetheless, vociferous shareholder com-
plaints about inadequate disclosure and dividend payouts continued and
are preserved in the company archives. Other widely held ﬁrms followed
suit, and the Dutch stock markets remained Europe’s ﬁnancial heart for a
century.
Among other things, spillovers from the series of French ﬁnancial crises,
which Murphy discusses in chapter 3, undermined Dutch investors’ conﬁ-
dence in ﬁnancial markets—slowly through the eighteenth century, and
then quite rapidly during the French occupation (1795–1813). In 1804, the
French imposed a version of their civil code. This was widely viewed as less
sophisticated than the indigenous legal system. It jettisoned two centuries
of Dutch accumulated legal wisdom and inﬂicted French investors’ aver-
sion of ﬁnancial markets upon the Netherlands. The French civil code,
along with a public debt (bequeathed by the French administration) of
more than four times national income, and a prolonged industrial disloca-
tion caused by the carve-out of Belgium as a separate state, made the ﬁrst
part of the nineteenth century a period of slow growth.
Industrial development in the second half of the nineteenth century was
ﬁnanced mainly with retained earnings from family ﬁrms that had slowly
accumulated wealth over the previous half-century. Wealthy families often
bought into new ﬁrms’ commercial paper, or prolongatie, and were ex-
pected to roll these investments over indeﬁnitely. Listed domestic shares
played a role toward the century’s end, but repeated egregious looting of
listed companies by insiders limited public investors’ appetites. Many
small Dutch investors, whose families had lost heavily in the oﬃcial de-
faults of the French revolutionary era, apparently preferred to save by
hoarding coins. Although Dutch markets were energetic throughout the
nineteenth century, their most active listings were foreign government
bonds and American railroad and industrial stocks.
During the twentieth century, a clear trend away from family control and
toward professional management is evident. Public equity issues and long-
term bank loans played an important role in an industrialization boom
from 1895 to roughly 1920, reinvigorating the stock markets. Unlike Ger-
many, the Dutch kept bankers to a secondary role in the governance and
ﬁnancing of industrial ﬁrms. Workers’ corporate governance voices grew
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muted than in Germany.
Despite the rise of public equity participation in Dutch ﬁrms, de Jong
and Röell conclude that real decision-making power remains with self-
perpetuating top corporate executives, entrenched behind formidable
takeover defenses. These defenses diﬀer from those in Anglo-American ﬁ-
nance and so merit mention. Reforms emulating German codetermination
mandated that companies establish supervisory boards but gave share-
holders no real role in choosing their members. These self-perpetuating su-
pervisory boards thus severed managers’ responsibility to shareholders.
Another entrenchment device is priority shares, to whose owners are rele-
gated key corporate governance decisions, such as board appointments.
Other so-called oligarchic devices relegate power over key decisions, like
payout policies, to organs other than the management board. Voting caps,
restricted voting shares, and super-voting shares are also widely used.
From the end of World War II through the 1970s, another popular en-
trenchment device was preference shares, issued to white squire sharehold-
ers at deep discounts and often carrying superior voting rights. Yet another
device is to place all voting shares with an income trust and then let public
investors buy units in that trust. Finally, interlocking directorships are
commonplace, apparently giving the Dutch corporate sector a clubby air.
De Jong and Röell ﬁnd that these devices are associated with depressed
shareholder value. Many of these entrenchment devices have come (or are)
in conﬂict with European Union directives, and they suggest that other en-
trenchment devices, like pyramidal groups, will grow more popular in their
place.
Högfeldt’s discussion compares the Netherlands to Sweden, stressing
the remarkably reticent role of Dutch banks compared to Swedish ones,
the remarkable array of takeover defenses in Dutch listed ﬁrms, and the ap-
parent acquiescence of Dutch politicians to these defenses.
Sweden
Swedes are justly proud of their unique model of highly egalitarian so-
cial democracy. Yet chapter 9, by Peter Högfeldt, shows that Swedes also
entrust their wealthiest families with an extraordinary concentration of
corporate governance power.
Högfeldt argues that this concentration occurs because of persistent So-
cial Democratic political inﬂuence, not despite it. The Social Democrats
became de facto guarantors of family capitalism because of a surprising
commonality of interests. Social Democratic politicians wanted a stable
large corporate sector controlled by Swedes, who were thought more sus-
ceptible than foreign owners to political pressure and hence more likely
to buy into Social Democracy eventually. Sweden’s wealthy families, who
used small blocks of super-voting shares to hold together their vast py-
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Social Democracy apparently seemed a reasonable price for policies that
locked in their corporate governance powers.
Högfeldt argues that the extensive separation of ownership from control
in these pyramidal structures makes external ﬁnancing expensive relative
to retained earnings, and so encourages existing ﬁrms to expand and dis-
courages new ﬁrms from listing. He calls this a political pecking order the-
ory of ﬁnancing. To this, the Social Democrats added tax subsidies for
ﬁrms that ﬁnance expansions with retained earnings and heavy taxation of
returns to public shareholders.
These entrenched mutually supportive political and corporate elites pro-
vided Swedes solid growth until the 1970s, when the economy proved un-
expectedly inﬂexible in dealing with external shocks. Institutions designed
to stabilize the largest ﬁrms and prevent upstarts from arising to challenge
them were ill suited to dealing with a rapidly shifting comparative advan-
tage in the global economy. Social Democracy had redistributed income
dramatically but could not manage the necessary redistribution of prop-
erty rights and wealth.
The result, according to Högfeldt, is an increasingly frail economy dom-
inated by elderly and inﬁrm companies, still controlled by the same wealthy
families that bought into the Social Democratic experiment more than half
a century ago.
Röell’s discussion stresses the diﬀerences between Sweden and the
Netherlands—both small, northern European social democracies. She
argues that voting caps and other residues of Napoleonic civil law en-
trenched insiders in the Netherlands while dual class shares and pyramids
entrenched Swedish insiders. Both sorts of entrenchment are costly, and
tallying up these costs is an important research problem.
The United Kingdom
The chapter on the United Kingdom by Franks, Mayer, and Rossi com-
pares a cadre of ﬁrms founded in 1900 to another founded in 1960. The au-
thors ﬁnd that ownership grows diﬀuse in both sets of ﬁrms at roughly the
same rate. Based on this, they argue that the forces that made founding
families withdraw from corporate governance in the modern United King-
dom also operated a century ago.
They argue that shareholder rights in the United Kingdom were ex-
tremely weak until the latter part of the twentieth century and so dispute
the contention of La Porta et al. (1999) that shareholder legal protection
permits diﬀuse ownership in the United Kingdom. If this were true, they
argue that corporate ownership should have been highly concentrated ear-
lier in the century, which they do not observe.
Providing a descriptive summary of United Kingdom corporate gover-
nance in greater generality, they further argue that pyramids gained im-
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rate disclosure, implemented in 1948, made hostile takeovers less risky for
raiders, and that pyramids developed as a defense against hostile take-
overs. However, they argue that institutional investors saw serious gover-
nance problems in these structures and lobbied to have them undone. British
institutional investors successfully pressed the London Stock Exchange
to adopt a takeover rule whereby any bid for 30 percent or more of a listed
ﬁrm must be a bid for 100 percent. Franks et al. propose that this rule
made pyramidal business groups untenable as takeover defenses and that
continued pressure from institutional investors on boards rapidly rid Brit-
ain of these structures.
Franks et al. also argue that concentrated corporate control and pyram-
idal groups are of more value to insiders elsewhere than in Britain. This is
because these ownership structures permit corporate insiders to extract
private beneﬁts of control. However, they propose that British corporate
insiders were and are governed by higher standards of ethical conduct,
which preclude the extraction of such private beneﬁts. Given this, British
corporate insiders were more readily convinced to sell their control blocks
and dismantle their pyramids. Thus, the current diﬀuse ownership of
British corporations came to prevail early in the twentieth century and still
persists.
Eichengreen’s discussion raises further questions. The Great Depression
was a critical juncture in the evolution of corporate governance in many
countries, yet it is little discussed. Why were British banks content without
the corporate governance powers of their German or Swedish peers? He
notes that Sylla and Smith (1995) emphasize the Directors Liability Act of
1890, which made company directors liable for statements in prospectuses
soliciting buyers for company shares, and the Companies Act of 1900,
which strengthened the principle of compulsory corporate disclosure, as the
explanation for why British ﬁnancial markets developed so rapidly around
the turn of the century. He speculates that shareholder rights might have
been stronger in early twentieth-century Britain than Franks et al. admit.
The United States
The chapter on the United States by Becht and DeLong explores how
that country came to have the atypically diﬀuse corporate ownership evi-
dent in ﬁgure 1. The great corporations of other countries are usually or-
ganized into business groups that are controlled by wealthy, old families or
powerful ﬁnancial intermediaries. Great corporations in the United States
are, for the most part, managed by career professionals and freestanding—
they do not have listed subsidiaries or parents.
These diﬀerences are developments of the twentieth century, for Moody
(1904) describes an America that was more “normal.” Powerful banking
houses and plutocratic families controlled much of the large corporate
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choosing, and replacing managers and setting corporate direction.
But by the 1930s, all of this had changed. A remarkable democratization
of shareholding took place between World War I and the end of World War
II. The beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation depend on the depth of the stock market.
High-pressure war-bond sales campaigns in 1917–18, popular magazines
on share ownership, and popular media coverage of Wall Street celebrities
brought middle American wealth into the stock market, vastly deepening
it and thus making the sacriﬁce of control for diversiﬁcation more attrac-
tive than elsewhere.
The burgeoning Progressive Movement deplored both the concentration
of economic power and the way business oligarchs like J. P. Morgan, the
Rockefellers, and others ruling vast pyramidal groups “turned conﬂict of
interest into a lifestyle.” Progressive politicians pilloried the “robber bar-
ons” of industry, their heirs, and J. P. Morgan.
Both to obtain the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation and to relieve their pum-
meling by the progressive press, many wealthy families sold majorities of
their ﬁrms’ shares into the stock markets. Of course, most of these families
at ﬁrst retained control through voting trusts, staggered boards, larger and
more complicated pyramidal holding companies with multiple classes of
stock, and other entrenchment devices.
But progressive politicians were on a roll, and they pressed antitrust reg-
ulators into service. In 1911, they succeeded in breaking up the Standard
Oil Trust, a huge group of petroleum and industrial companies formerly
controlled by the Rockefeller family. Over the subsequent decades, these
emerged as freestanding, widely held, and professionally managed entities.
Becht and DeLong track this process in detail for Standard Oil of New
Jersey.
America’s response to the Great Depression then razed much of what
family capitalism remained. Two great pyramids, the Insull and van
Sweringen business groups, collapsed after the 1929 crash. These high-
proﬁle collapses appear to have linked the Depression with highly concen-
trated corporate control in the public mind, justifying a barrage of pro-
gressive reform. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 pared commercial from
investment banking. The Public Utility Company Holding Companies Act
of 1935 forbade pyramidal control of utility companies. A series of regula-
tory reforms governing banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and
pension funds prevented any of these organizations from accumulating
any serious corporate governance inﬂuence either.
The activist U.S. courts intervened further to keep shareholdings dis-
persed. For example, in 1957 the Supreme Court ordered the DuPont fam-
ily to sell its equity block in General Motors to prevent DuPont from ob-
taining “an illegal preference over its competitors in the sale to General
Motors of its products.”
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listed 200 U.S. ﬁrms. Of these, 24 are subsidiaries in pyramids and only 34
have no controlling shareholder. They explore the history of the last and
ﬁnd that they became widely held when their founding families sold out, ei-
ther directly or with trust promoters as intermediaries. Some of this might
have been market timing—selling stocks for more than their fundamental
values during bubbles. Most of it was probably founding families appreci-
ating the value of diversiﬁcation in a deep stock market. These wealthy
families often retained inﬂuence on their boards without holding control
blocks.
Stung by progressive-era condemnation, they often turned to philan-
thropy, distancing themselves and their heirs even further from governance
issues. Thus, modern Americans associate the names Rockefeller, Hark-
ness, Carnegie, and Guggenheim with the performing arts, universities,
and museums, not with the great business groups that built those fortunes.
Activist judges and progressive politicians, aided by fortune, thus eﬀec-
tively entrusted the governance of America’s great corporations to profes-
sional managers. The Securities and Exchanges Act of 1934 relegated to
management control over who can stand for election to boards, and left
boards to monitor management. Although the hostile takeovers of the
1980s disrupted this arrangement for some ﬁrms, and some U.S. institu-
tional investors are clearing their throats, this situation has kept most
American ﬁrms freestanding and professionally run ever since.
Richard Sylla’s discussion contrasts Becht and DeLong’s arguments
with those of Dunlavy (2004), who contends that by 1900 American ﬁrms
werealready exceptional in having one-vote-per-share voting rights, giving
large shareholders more say in corporate aﬀairs than small shareholders.
In Europe, Dunlavy argues, shareholder voting rights were more “demo-
cratic” in limiting the power of large shareholders, as was the case earlier
in the United States. Sylla notes that Alexander Hamilton proponed such
limits on large blockholder votes as necessary to prevent a few large play-
ers from dominating corporate policies. We are impressed that Hamilton
was clearly more concerned about entrenched large blockholders, not pro-
fessional managers, abusing small shareholders, as are students of corpo-
rate governance in most modern countries other than the United Kingdom
and United States.
What Are the Common Factors?
Each chapter highlights the intricate complexity of ﬁnancial history. Yet
there are common threads spanning many countries. This section tracks
some of the most visible of these threads and ties them to current thinking
about the reasons why corporate governance is so diﬀerent in diﬀerent
countries.
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The clearest lesson, evident in every chapter, is that “things happen,” and
constrain what can happen next. The history of corporate governance, like
other historical processes, is path dependent.
Had France not suﬀered repeated ﬁnancial collapses at the hands of
John Law, the Revolutionary Assembly, and the Crédit Mobilier, share-
holder rights in that country might have solidiﬁed much earlier and much
harder. Murphy argues that the formation of new joint-stock companies
and other large enterprises essentially ceased in France until 1840 and re-
sumed only very slowly thereafter. Other students of European history
make similar points—Frentrop (2003, p. 137) writes that “following the
experience of 1720, French public opinion developed a violent distaste for
anything to do with ﬁnancial markets.” He goes on to argue that “A simi-
lar opinion was expressed in the Netherlands.” Frentrop argues that the
Napoleonic Code, which French armies spread across the continent in the
early nineteenth century, carried that distaste, and was far less conducive
to large business undertakings than was the previous Dutch legal system.
Perhaps accidents of history explain the ﬁndings of La Porta et al. (1999)
that countries with legal systems based on the Napoleonic Code have
stunted ﬁnancial systems.
Yet other countries underwent ﬁnancial crises and responded entirely
diﬀerently. Britain’s South Sea bubble closely paralleled Law’s Mississippi
bubble, and its response, the Bubble Act, hampered equity markets for gen-
erations afterward. But sound ventures like the British East India Com-
pany and the Hudson’s Bay Company sustained a ﬁnancial sector that soon
boasted sophisticated merchant banks.5 Psychologists puzzle over why
some people are devastated by emotional traumas that others recover from
on their own. Economists, too, understand little about how crises aﬀect in-
stitutional development. The histories in this volume show this to be an im-
portant fault in our discipline.
China’s stock market, founded in the 1870s, saw the same sorts of ma-
nipulation and insider trading that characterized other markets around the
world, and collapsed in 1883—and again in 1922. Perhaps these misfor-
tunes pushed China oﬀ a path to free market democracy she might other-
wise have followed. Chinese capitalism never recovered, shares in Chinese
companies grew illiquid, and the faltering free market economy fell to
Mao’s Socialist revolution.
In 1933, a committee of experts assembled under the Weimar Republic
completed its deliberations on separating commercial from investment
banking. Had it favored this separation, German banks would have relin-
quished most of their corporate governance inﬂuence over nonﬁnancial
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did. However, the committee favored the status quo—possibly because its
chairman, Reichsbank President Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht feared
setting a berserker like Gottfried Feder loose to reform the system.6 Feder,
a founding member of the National Socialist Party and Hitler’s banking
advisor, was famous for his 1919 Manifesto on Breaking the Shackles of In-
terest and advocated the nationalization of all banks and the total abolish-
ment of interest.
Perhaps China, Germany, Japan, and Italy might have evolved ingrained
cultures of shareholder capitalism had they avoided prolonged economic
collapses in the 1920s and 1930s—and if Fascism and Socialism had been
less entrancing. Had Socialism been less in vogue in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, perhaps India, the Netherlands, and Sweden might have gone the route
of American corporate governance. If Colbert had been British, the English-
speaking world had had a few more ﬁnancial crises, or Fascism and Social-
ism had had more persuasive English-speaking advocates, would America
and Britain be dominated by large family-controlled business groups?
But concluding that everything is a concordance of accidents is too simple.
However satisfying that view to pure historians of individual countries, eco-
nomic history is about patterns and regularities amid those accidents. Fortu-
nately, many issues that ought to aﬀect corporate governance are already
highlighted in the literature. Even more fortunately, the chapters in this vol-
ume present a wealth of detail that helps ﬁll in the gaps. It would be wonder-
ful for economists if we could conclude that one theory is correct and discard
the others, but economics is rarely so simple. All of the major theories that
purport to explain historical and cross-country diﬀerences in corporate con-
trol ﬁnd support, though some require modiﬁcation in passing.
Ideas
Wars, upheavals, and many other catastrophes aﬀected many countries
simultaneously but triggered diﬀerent reactions in diﬀerent countries—
perhaps depending on the popularity or unpopularity of certain ideologies
at that point in time. Rarely, as after the English Civil War and American
Revolution, private property rights coalesced. Perhaps more typically,
French economic and political turmoil in the 1720s resurrected traditional
Catholic restraints on business. More turmoil at the end of the eighteenth
century institutionalized a suspicion of all things ﬁnancial, and wars ex-
porting the French Revolution spread this to the Netherlands and else-
where. The chapters in this book collectively suggest the importance, for
good and ill, of ideologies at critical moments when economies are ripe for
institutional transformations.
One such critical moment was the Great Depression of the 1930s, when
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ences in corporate governance. Financial catastrophes in many countries
in the 1920s and 1930s, and ideological reactions to them, deeply aﬀected
their subsequent evolution of corporate control.
In the 1930s, the United States was deeply inﬂuenced by the progressive
ideology of Louis Brandeis, Thorsten Veblen, and others. Roosevelt’s New
Dealers realigned American institutions to this ideology when the Great
Depression undermined popular faith in America’s older institutions. Dis-
persing economic power as widely as possible was a key part of this. Thus,
the American government undertook to break up that country’s great py-
ramidal corporate groups by banning large pyramidal groups from con-
trolling public utility companies, applying taxes to intercorporate divi-
dends, and strengthening public shareholders’ property rights over their
investments.7 This fortuitous coincidence of ideology and opportunity to
act created America’s exceptional large corporate sector composed mainly
of freestanding widely held ﬁrms.
In Sweden, the same Great Depression had completely diﬀerent results.
The ideology waiting in the wings in Sweden was Social Democracy. When
Swedish voters lost faith in their traditional institutions, Social Democrats
took power and radically concentrated economic power in two ways. First,
the state assumed power over the commanding heights of the Swedish
economy. Second, widespread corporate bankruptcies left large banks, like
that owned by the Wallenberg family, holding control blocks in most large
Swedish companies. These banks reorganized these companies into the
large pyramidal groups that currently dominate the Swedish economy.
Högfeldt (chap. 9 in this volume) argues that the Social Democrats and
these powerful families developed a symbiotic relationship—the families
supported the Social Democrats, who enacted policies that favored large
old ﬁrms and hampered upstart ﬁrms.
Mixtures of Socialist and nationalist ideologies emerged in Germany,
Italy, and Japan during the Great Depression. Ultimately, radical nation-
alists won in all three, but not without adopting many Socialist policies. In
the 1920s and 1930s, the major German banks had accumulated huge
holdings of their own shares in eﬀorts to stabilize their own stock prices.
The National Socialists conﬁscated these holdings, eﬀectively nationaliz-
ing the banks and imposing party control over their proxy voting pro-
cesses. Multiple voting shares were nulliﬁed, except of family ﬁrms con-
trolled by gentiles, and voting caps did not apply to banks voting the
holdings of individual shareholders by right of proxy. In this way, the Reich
de facto nationalized the greater part of the German economy while leav-
ing the formalities of private ownership in place.8 The Fascist government
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8. See Kleeberg (1987, p. 83).of Italy nationalized the banks, which had seized control blocks in many
large bankrupt companies. Italy’s postwar governments retained many as-
pects of Mussolini’s economic system, including large pyramidal groups of
listed companies with state holding companies at their apexes. Japan’s mil-
itary government likewise placed military representatives on all boards to
ensure that large ﬁrms were managed patriotically and not for mere proﬁt.
In Canada, socialists and progressives trumpeted opposing visions of re-
form in the 1930s, letting old-line parties hold the center and retain power.
This preserved its prewar system of pyramidal groups. The corporate gov-
ernance of large Canadian ﬁrms changed only gradually over the subse-
quent decades. Britain, France, and the Netherlands also seem to have pre-
served their pre-Depression systems of corporate governance.
Another example arises in connection with India and other postcolonial
economies. Das (2002) and others argue that intellectual fashions at the
London School of Economics adversely aﬀected India’s economic policies,
including corporate governance. Similar eﬀects elsewhere in the third
world seem highly plausible.
Families
A purpose of this book was to provide a richer rendering of corporate
governance systems throughout the world. The geographic and chrono-
logical scope of the project allows us to make observations as well as raise
important questions regarding how enterprise is organized in diﬀerent
parts of the world. Importantly, the book speaks to the neglect of family
enterprise relative to its role in capitalist economies. Family capitalism
contributes to the wealth and/or poverty of a nation, with appreciation to
Adam Smith and David Landes.
A theme throughout this volume is the importance of large family busi-
ness groups in most developed economies. This conﬁrms La Porta et al.
(1999) and Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003), who conclude (p. 2167)
that most large businesses throughout the world “are controlled by their
founders, or by the founder’s families and heirs.” Moreover, there is no ev-
idence of a uniform natural transition from family capitalism to manage-
rial capitalism. Franks, Mayer, and Rossi’s chapter describes such a transi-
tion in the United Kingdom, and in chapter 8 de Jong and Röell describe
a form of managerial capitalism that is perhaps native to the Netherlands.
In chapter 11 Becht and DeLong describe the transition from family to
managerial capitalism in the United States as a convolution of accidents
and America’s unique progressive ideology. In chapter 4 Fohlin shows that,
although Germany developed a variant of managerial capitalism because
of banking laws left in place by the National Socialists, large family ﬁrms
and groups remain very important there. Japan’s variant of managerialism
was a forced postwar transplant of American institutions. In Canada,
managerial capitalism displaced family groups through the ﬁrst part of the
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where, family business groups were seldom challenged except by state-
owned enterprises. Professional managers, where they exist at all, are
merely hired help employed by enormously wealthy families.
The studies in this volume provide abundant evidence of family control
encompassing both best and worst practice. How large family groups per-
form, and how they aﬀect their economies, seems highly context dependent.
Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) stress the legal protection of public
shareholders, arguing that heirs relinquish control to better-qualiﬁed pro-
fessional managers and diversify their wealth across many ﬁrms only if they
trust the corporate governance of those ﬁrms, and conclude (p. 2193) that
“the separation of ownership and management is thus an indication of a su-
perior corporate governance environment. The lack of such separation, and
the prevalence of family ﬁrms, is evidence of ﬁnancial underdevelopment.”
But La Porta et al. (1997a, 1998) show that many highly developed econ-
omies provide few rights to public shareholders. This might occur naturally
if family control oﬀers many advantages. For example, close family bonds
might enable a degree of cooperation that is more diﬃcult to sustain
among nonkin. Entrusting control over diﬀerent ﬁrms to blood kin might
facilitate the transfer of knowledge, roles, and routines from ﬁrm to ﬁrm as
well as from generation to generation. In other words, large family business
groups may represent eﬀective ways of organizing enterprises that survive
the rigors of economic selection. Khanna and Palepu (chap. 5) stress this
naturally cooperative behavior as the glue that holds family groups to-
gether and the hard-earned reputations of certain families for their relative
success.
But they also show that family business groups rise and fall in India, and
other chapters identify analogous change elsewhere. Schumpeter (1951)
makes a similar observation about European family enterprises. He posits
several factors that alter the relative positions of wealthy families within a
ruling class, the breaching of class barriers—upward or downward, and
the rise and fall of whole classes. These factors are chance; shrewd man-
agement of the families’ position, especially via advantageous arranged
marriages; diﬀerences in the usefulness of families to their feudal superi-
ors; and diﬀerent entrepreneurial ability in successive generations of the
family. He argues for a sort of automatism—a family that simply reinvests
a proportion of its proﬁts in its business is bound to go under sooner or
later. Bad luck strikes, competition emerges, politics shift, and, most im-
portant, entrepreneurs die. Schumpeter (1951, p. 122) stresses that rare en-
trepreneurial ability is the foundation of most great family fortunes but is
an individual trait and does “not coincide with the logical necessity that
obtains in the case of family enterprises.” This, he continues, means “the
complete displacement of powerful family positions as typical phenome-
non, not merely the shifting of positions between families.” The entry and
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vive, but families come and go. He concludes (p. 130) that “the persistence
of class position is an illusion, created by the slowness of change and the
stability of class character as such and of its social ﬂuid.”
Ultimately, Schumpeter’s (1912) notion of creative destruction is an
underlying principle of capitalism. But innovation and entrepreneurship
need to be nurtured. Oligarchic family elites can use their considerable
wealth and connections to maintain their power and control at the expense
of economic development. Haber (1999), Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung
(2004), Olson (1963, 1982), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Thurow (1989), and
others call such entrenched elites oligarchies. Thurow, for example, distin-
guishes establishments from oligarchies. Both are well-educated, wealthy,
powerful, intermarried elites who
run their countries....   [But] the central goal of an establishment is to in-
sure that the system works so that the country will in the long run be suc-
cessful. An establishment is self-conﬁdent that if the system works and
if their country does well, they will personally do well....  I n  contrast an
oligarchy is a group of insecure individuals who amass funds in secret
Swiss bank accounts. Because they think that they must always look out
for their own immediate self-interest, they aren’t interested in taking
time and eﬀort to improve their country’s long-run prospects. (p. 405)
The studies in this volume provide ample evidence of powerful family busi-
ness groups behaving as establishments, oligarchies, or ﬁrst one and then
the other.
Business Groups
Conceptualizing economic activity in terms of business groups, as op-
posed to freestanding ﬁrms, is an incompletely understood area—perhaps
because groups are rarest in the United States and United Kingdom, where
business research is most active. A literature on business groups is coalesc-
ing but is probably decades behind that for other issues of similar impor-
tance.9 The literature is probably most developed in connection with
Japan, where area studies scholars have long appreciated business groups’
importance.10 However, Japanese business groups, as Morck and Naka-
mura show in chapter 7, have a history starkly diﬀerent from groups else-
where. Most important, large horizontal Japanese keiretsu are controlled
by managers, not wealthy families.
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Becht (2001), Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang
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10. See, e.g., Aoki (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), and especially Nakatani
(1984).Humans’ tendency to organize activities along patterns of kinship may
be biologically innate, as Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) suggest. But this
organizing propensity continues long after the biological necessity is re-
moved, and often extends to economic activity. Family and kinship group-
ings are likely the oldest and most pervasive forms of group behavior. From
an economic perspective, Khanna and Palepu (2000) conceptualize family
business groups “as a mechanism through which intragroup transaction
costs are lowered, by encouraging information dissemination among
group ﬁrms, reducing the possibility of contractual disputes, and provid-
ing a low-cost mechanism for dispute resolution” (p. 271).
Economic welfare, in theory, is greatly enhanced if trade extends beyond
kinship groups and even encompasses anonymous transactions. Firms that
raise capital from public shareholders at low cost can expand more rapidly
than those constrained by family wealth. Family-controlled pyramidal
groups arose everywhere as devices to tap public equity ﬁnancing on a huge
scale but retain family control over all key decisions.
Groups that do not ﬁt this pattern, such as modern Japanese keiretsu,
German bank groups, and groups with widely held or state-owned enter-
prises at their apexes, are exceptions, but important ones. In every case,
they too are structured to preserve public equity ﬁnancing while locking
in control by insiders—professional managers, bankers, or bureaucrats,
rather than wealthy families. The broader theme of concentrated control
seems to encompass all business groups everywhere.
Why might such concentrated control develop and persist? Why does it
most often rest with a handful of wealthy families? At this point we can
only speculate.
There is safety in numbers, and as Aristotle wrote in his Ethics, “Men
journey together with a view to particular advantage.” Sociologists have
long recognized that “involvement and participation in groups can have
positive consequences for the individual and the community” (Portes,
1998, p. 2). Granovetter (in press) speculates that American-style free-
standing widely held ﬁrms did not last in postwar Japan because the “plan-
ners had dramatically underestimated the extent to which the dense web of
ties connecting ﬁrms within these groups, and the resulting sense of group
identity and patterns of customary cooperation, could persist and regen-
erate even without direction from family owners.” Perhaps, but group iden-
tity and cooperation need not require intercorporate equity holdings,
which Morck and Nakamura’s chapter argues were established as takeover
defenses in the 1950s and 1960s. In their view, Japanese groups were raised
from the dead to protect the positions of top corporate managers.
Khanna and Palepu (1997, p. 41) note that the “diversiﬁed business
group remains the dominant form of enterprise throughout most emerging
markets.” They caution economic planners and executives in those coun-
tries against imitating Western-style freestanding industrially focused
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stitute for markets and institutions that permit anonymous or arm’s-length
transactions in developed countries. Khanna and Palepu (p. 41) argue that
if “a country’s product, capital, and labor markets; its regulatory system;
and its mechanisms for enforcing contracts” are not trusted, business
groups substitute for them. Trust between family members running various
group ﬁrms substitutes for trust in business contracts, ﬁnancial markets, or
labor market signals.
Trust
Cooperative behavior with blood kin may well be genetically pro-
grammed, making families the default junctures of high-trust behavior for
the individuals within them. But wider networks of high-trust behavior ap-
pear to be important to the creation of an eﬀective system of governance
for large organizations and of reliable institutions in general.11 Mayer,
Davis, and Schoorman (1995, p. 712) deﬁne trust as “the willingness of a
party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expec-
tation that the other will perform a particular action important to the
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.”
Arrow (1974, p. 23) explains the advantages it bestows thus: “Trust is an
important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely eﬃcient; it saves
people a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s
word.”Trust can lower transaction costs and permit eﬀective coordination
and control. Macaulay (1963, p. 55) makes a strong case that the gover-
nance of business transactions has an important dimension that goes be-
yond formal agreements and contracts. He argues (p. 58) that formal legal
contracts cover a very small portion of all business conducted, and that
business people largely prefer to rely on mechanisms such as “a man’s
word,” a “handshake,” or “common honesty and decency.”
For Fukuyama (1995) a high level of societal trust improves the perfor-
mance for all the society’s institutions. The absence of trust—or, more se-
riously, distrust—makes coordination and control problematic. In certain
situations, such as the grafting of Western capitalism onto a developing
economy with low general levels of trust for nonkin, a “mismatch” of trust
occurs where people take advantage of the erroneous expectations of oth-
ers. This is a key theme in the chapter by Goetzmann and Köll, in which
Western institutions built on certain assumptions of trust failed abjectly in
prerevolutionary China when adjoined to its ancient entrenched bureau-
cracy.
Although readily destroyed, trust in a society’s institutions is not easily
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Putman (1993), and Fukuyama (1995).built up. Putnam (1993) describes how economically important networks
of trust in Northern Italy were built through centuries of successful asso-
ciation. The chapter on Canada by Morck et al. describes that country’s
evolution from a low-trust society in which families were virtually the only
instruments of trust reliable enough to ﬁnance business ventures. Mur-
phy’s chapter on France describes the destruction of popular trust in the
institutions of arm’s-length ﬁnance.
Certain organizational arrangements can substitute to some extent for
low trust outside families and can even increase ambient levels of trust, al-
beit slowly. Khanna and Palepu’s chapter on India describes the impor-
tance of ethnic minorities in India’s early large businesses. The relatively
small size of these communities in large markets permitted both relation-
ships of trust between key decision makers and certain economies of scale.
In India and other countries, small elites developed within which huge
deals could be consummated largely on the basis of trust.
This view of business groups is underscored by the business histories
of many of the countries surveyed in this volume. The earliest origins of
Japan’s family business groups, or zaibatsu, were to circumvent low-trust
problems. For example, the Mitsui family expanded into commodity trad-
ing because their silk business depended on barter deals. They later moved
into banking to move Japan beyond barter deals into a real ﬁnancial sys-
tem.
It also helps explain the structures of business groups. The relational ap-
proach to strategy and economics propounded by Dyer and Singh (1998),
Landes (1998), and Portes (1998) suggests that economic success depends
on eﬀective network relationships. Burt (1992b, p. 11) thus argues that
“something about the structure of the player’s network and the location of
a player’s contacts in the social structure of the arena provides a competi-
tive advantage.” In this light, business groups should be structured around
critical transactions where trust is important. Eﬀective networks contain
enough members to accomplish the task, but not so many as to be unman-
ageable nor unnecessary or redundant.
Burt (1992a) models eﬀective network ties as links to clusters of re-
sources. The number of ties matters less than the clusters of resources ac-
cessed. A bigger network is only more eﬀective if it connects to additional
pertinent clusters of resources. An eﬀective network thus contains “struc-
tural holes,” where the costs of expansion outweigh the beneﬁts (Burt
1992a, p. 65). There are advantages (Burt 1997, p. 343) to “having a con-
tact network rich in structural holes.” Business groups should grow to en-
compass relevant clusters but avoid redundant relationships by economiz-
ing on ties. Thus, very early Canadian groups began with timber businesses
and expanded into ship building, then shipping, and then insurance.
Business-government relations are also critical links for business groups
in many countries. Högfeldt’s chapter on Sweden essentially argues that
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links to the whole of the private sector. By abetting dynastic family control
over wide circles of ﬁrms, these politicians established a system where they
could negotiate with the greater part of the large corporate sector over a
small table. He adds that this may have stymied the development of arm’s-
length institutions in Sweden. This logic of business groups as second-best
solutions impeding movement toward ﬁrst-best solutions is echoed in sev-
eral other chapters.
Franks et al. (chap. 10) argue that fear of losing one’s reputation spread
trustworthy behavior widely across British corporate governance by the
early twentieth century. But in the rest of this volume, legal or regulatory
sanction as reprisal for unacceptable grasping seems necessary to elevate
ambient levels of trust, though exactly which sanctions mattered histori-
cally in which countries remains unclear.12 In the United States especially,
Becht and DeLong (chap. 11) see popular disquiet with concentrated eco-
nomic power as perhaps more important than economic ineﬃciency in ad-
vancing tax, securities law, and other regulations that ultimately destabi-
lized large business groups.13 And Sylla and Smith (1995) argue that law
played a greater role in Britain than Franks et al. allow.
Law
In a fundamental paper, La Porta et al. (1997a) argue that stock market
development should be positively correlated with shareholder legal pro-
tection. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) formalize this argument with a
model in which controlling shareholders sell out to diversify if their rights
as portfolio investors are legally protected. Otherwise, they remain undi-
versiﬁed blockholders in the companies they manage and consume what
private beneﬁts they can extract from their public shareholders. La Porta
et al. (1997a) measure shareholder rights by focusing on six speciﬁc legal
rights shareholders have in the United States and counting how many of
them shareholders have in other countries.14 They ﬁnd that in the 1990s
countries with stronger shareholder protection were characterized by
larger stock markets and more diﬀusely held large corporations, and that
these countries tend to have legal systems derived from British common
law. The common-law countries in ﬁgure 1 are Australia, Canada, Hong
Kong, Ireland, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, and they clearly do have more widely held large ﬁrms than
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12. See La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003).
13. See Morck (2004b) for detail on these regulatory attacks.
14. This index adds one point if the country lets shareholders mail in proxy votes, does not
require shares to be deposited prior to a general shareholders’ meeting, allows cumulative vot-
ing or proportional representation of minorities in the board, provides an oppressed minor-
ity remedy, lets an owner of 10 percent or less of the share capital call an extraordinary share-
holders’ meeting, or lets shareholders’ preemptive rights be voided only by a shareholders’
vote.the other countries, all of which employ civil codes of one form or another.
La Porta et al. (1997a, 1999) conclude that diﬀuse ownership and share-
holder capitalism require solid legal protection of public shareholders’
property rights in their investments.
Several of the chapters in this volume beg to diﬀer. Murphy remarks in
chapter 3 that “in a post Enron, Tyco, WorldCom world, French jurists and
ﬁnanciers might be permitted a wry smile at the implication that the com-
mon-law system is linked to a strong system of corporate control.” Fohlin
argues that her chapter “casts doubt on the notion that civil law traditions
per se consistently undermine market functioning” because German stock
markets ebbed and rose at various points, while its legal system changed
little. She also fails to ﬁnd any temporal correlation between changes in
shareholder protection and ownership diﬀusion. Franks, Mayer, and Rossi
argue that British shareholders had none of the legal rights La Porta et al.
(1997a) enumerate until 1948, and only attained their current level of pro-
tection in the ﬁnal third of the twentieth century.15 Yet they ﬁnd that the
ownership of new British ﬁrms dispersed as quickly early in the twentieth
century and in its latter decades. Canadian shareholders had few of these
same rights until the 1960s, but Morck, Percy, Tian, and Yeung ﬁnd that
Canadian corporate ownership grew widely dispersed by the middle of the
twentieth century and that family-controlled pyramidal groups staged a
roaring comeback at the century’s end and under unprecedentedly strong
shareholder rights laws. France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
and Sweden all had economically very important stock markets oﬀ and on
through their history—especially at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, as noted by Rajan and Zingales (2003). Becht and DeLong argue in
chapter 11 that U.S. shareholders remain vulnerable to many forms of ex-
propriation by corporate insiders despite their statutory legal rights, and
Aganin and Volpin (chap. 6) argue that shareholder rights in Italy are a
dead letter because of general judicial system ineﬃciency.
Three general criticisms of La Porta et al. (1997a, 1999) emerge. First,
the timing of improved shareholder rights does not match the timing of
ownership dispersion in several countries. Second, the correlation between
large stock markets and shareholder rights is highly speciﬁc to the late
twentieth century. Third, the La Porta et al. shareholder rights index is an
incomplete proxy for actual shareholder legal protection. The thesis that
statutory shareholder rights cause stock market development and owner-
ship diﬀusion is hard to square with these ﬁndings. However, the thesis that
a country’s legal system, or some other factor highly correlated with this,
predisposes it to a certain form of capitalism, which is really the funda-
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15. Cheﬃns (2001) also argues that British legal developments weaken the thesis of La
Porta et al. (1997a, 1998), though Sylla and Smith (1995) argue that late nineteenth-century
developments in British law actually did strengthen shareholder rights considerably.mental point La Porta et al. advance, is harder to challenge. Indeed, the
chapters of this book provide fairly solid evidence in its favor.
Murphy (chap. 3) does not argue that the French legal code is unimpor-
tant but rather that French public investors grew skeptical of stock markets
because of repeated ﬁnancial crises. Yet the response of French politicians
and jurists to each crisis was not to strengthen investor rights. Rather, the
response to the Mississippi Company bubble was to reassert Roman
Catholic prohibitions on interest and to all but shut down the ﬁnancial sys-
tem. Neither the revolutionary government’s assignats nor the Crédit Mo-
bilier ﬁasco heralded stronger investor rights. Likewise, the responses of
the Dutch, Italian, Japanese, and Swedish governments to the ﬁnancial
crises of the 1920s and 1930s were to substitute various mechanisms of
state-controlled capital allocation for their stock markets. In contrast, a
not dissimilar succession of ﬁnancial manias, panics, and crises in Britain,
Canada, and the United States ultimately strengthened shareholder rights.
Clearly something in their legal systems changed. Why did ﬁnancial crises
trigger fuller disclosure, better regulation, and stronger investor rights in
common-law countries but a disconnection of the stock market from the
economy in countries with civil law traditions?
Aganin and Volpin (chap. 6) shed light on what happened in Italy. After
the crash of 1907, Fiat’s shareholders sued the Agnelli family for account-
ing irregularities and stock price manipulation. The Agnellis were cleared
of all wrongdoing, but investor conﬁdence in the stock market was deeply
shaken, and Italy remained in a prolonged ﬁnancial crisis through 1914.
Aganin and Volpin argue that “there was a general market perception that
universal banks and corporate insiders like the Agnellis used the invest-
ment boom early in the century to pump and dump their shares.”
Morck and Nakamura (chap. 7) describe how the American occupation
force redesigned the ownership structures of Japan’s major corporations in
the late 1940s to make them widely held. Yet Japanese managers, fearful of
hostile takeovers, placed blocks of stock with each other’s ﬁrms to defend
against raiders, forming the current keiretsu groups. Recent work in the
United States and other countries shows that barriers to takeovers are not
in the best interests of shareholders. Yet the Japanese managers acted any-
way, for Japanese shareholders had no legal right to object.
One interpretation of the ﬁndings in this volume is that both civil law and
common-law countries create large ﬁnancial markets but that common-
law countries are better able to sustain them over the longer run. Perhaps,
from time to time, a new generation in a civil law country discards the ad-
vice of its grandparents and invests heavily in stocks. Once it becomes clear
that its rights are ill protected, the values of its portfolios collapse and the
next generation or two shun the market again until collective memory
fades and a new generation of marks is born.
But what is it about common-law systems that sustains large stock mar-
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(1997a) shareholder rights are recent statutory innovations in most com-
mon-law countries, why are investors in those countries generally more ac-
cepting of stocks? One possibility is deeper characteristics distinguishing
common law from civil law.
One such diﬀerence emerged in the early seventeenth century, when
France was exhausted by its Wars of Religion (1562–98) and England was
devastated by its Civil War (1625–49). Cardinal Richelieu sought to reunite
France by centralizing power in the hands of an absolute monarchy. Blood-
ied by years of chaos, the French people accepted this as a sort of salvation.
The arbitrary Revolutionary Tribunals of the late eighteenth century left
the public mistrustful of judicial discretion and probably made the French
people, and Napoleon in particular, receptive to the rigid codiﬁcation of
the law and the subjugation of judges to the executive branch of govern-
ment. Thus, Napoleon replaced France’s prerevolutionary civil code with
a new, expanded Napoleonic Code, and his armies exported this across the
European continent. Meanwhile, England had developed a tradition of an
independent judiciary—the Courts of Common Law—as alternatives to
the royal courts—the Exchequer and the Court of Star Chamber. This was
a reﬂection of a broader struggle for power between the monarch and Par-
liament that came to a head with Cromwell’s Commonwealth (1649–60).
Parliament won both the English Civil War and the battle for the courts
that followed. English courts became independent of the executive branch
and subject only to Parliament.16
This gave English and French jurisprudence very diﬀerent ﬂavors.17 To
vastly oversimplify, the French courts existed to implement the will of the
king, while the English courts existed to protect free Englishmen from
abuse by their king. Over time, government came to be substituted for king,
but the diﬀerence persists. Common-law systems protect the weak from the
strong; civil law systems enforce the edict of the state. This distinction dis-
poses courts in common-law countries to protect public shareholders, even
in the absence of explicit statutes.
A second underlying diﬀerence is that civil codes provide detailed in-
structions to judges that try to anticipate all possible cases and specify de-
cisions for each. The judge looks to the letter of the law anew in each case.
Merryman (1966, p. 586) describes the resulting dominance of doctrine
and how judicial decisions read “more like excerpts from treatises or com-
mentaries on the codes than the reasoning of a court in deciding a concrete
case.” Under common law, judges base rulings upon general principles and
previous cases as well as legislation. This, with the relative independence of
the judiciary from political interference, renders allcommon-law courts, to
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16. See also Hayek (1960) and Glaeser and Shleifer (2002).
17. See Watson (1981), Pistor et al. (1999), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002), and others.some extent, activist courts. Decisions are less responsive to the minutia of
a legal code and more to the perceived viewpoint of a reasonable man, a
prudent man, or the like. Corporate insiders who pilfer from public share-
holders in a common-law jurisdiction, even if they fastidiously avoid
breaching all written statutes, can never be entirely certain the courts will
not ﬁnd a precedent or general principle to convict them anyway. This un-
certainty might contribute to better general treatment of public investors
in common-law countries, even before those countries enacted the speciﬁc
statutory rights La Porta et al. (1997a) enumerate.
A third diﬀerence, which ﬂows from the ﬁrst two, is the quality of judi-
cial decisions. Both common-law and civil code systems can be of high
quality, but both also have weak points.18 Three particular vulnerabilities
to which civil law systems are prone are of special concern in cases of cor-
porate governance that pit connected corporate insiders against impecu-
nious public shareholders. First, because civil law judges are bureaucrats
subordinate to the government, ill-functioning courts are malleable to po-
litical pressure.19 Second, because decisions depend on complicated codes
rather than broad principles, a poorly functioning civil law system can fa-
vor litigants who are better at parsing those codes. Third, because prece-
dent is less a guiding principle, civil law judges can shrug oﬀ how their
judgments aﬀect people’s future behavior in the belief that good bureau-
crats should defer to politicians.
These diﬀerences can all be overstated, of course. The United States has
codiﬁed its contract law in the Uniform Commercial Code, and its securi-
ties laws in the Securities and Exchanges Act and various and sundry leg-
islation. These codes are easily as detailed as many civil codes.20 Mean-
while, Enriques (2002) documents how civil codes contain “general
clauses” instructing judges to apply certain standards on a case-by-case
basis, and civil law judges sometimes even create new standards or extend
existing ones. Although these clauses theoretically allow civil law judges
latitude to convict wrongdoers who delicately avoid breaking the letter of
the law, they seldom exercise it—perhaps because of their doctrinal train-
ing. Finally, the executive branch of government appoints high court
judges in most common-law countries, and some might see this as subju-
gating the courts. There is even disagreement among legal scholars about
the degree of protection civil law countries actually accord public share-
holders. For example, Ramseyer and Nakazato (1999) argue that Japanese
law gives public shareholders fairly strong legal rights. Many legal scholars
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18. Berkowitz and Clay (2004) ﬁnd that U.S. states with civil law colonial legal systems
(Florida, Louisiana, and southwestern states taken from Mexico) have more constitutional
instability than purely common-law states. Whether this reﬂects inherent problems in civil law
or in switching legal systems is not fully clear, though they favor the latter explanation.
19. See Hayek (1960), Mahoney (2001), and La Porta et al. (2004).
20. See Weiss (2000).thus regard the distinction between civil and common law as primarily of
historical interest.21
Nonetheless, these three diﬀerences might perhaps coalesce into an ex-
planation.22 Many common-law and civil code countries had large stock
markets to which numerous small investors entrusted their savings at vari-
ous points in their histories. All of these countries experienced ﬁnancial
panics and crises, but these seem to have devastated shareholder cultures
in civil law countries worse than in common-law countries.
Albeit often with very long lags, ﬁnancial crises induced stronger share-
holder legal rights in common-law countries. Coﬀee (2001) argues that
common law created a better environment for self-regulation. Moreover, a
succession of British court decisions and laws, beginning with the Joint
Stock Companies Registration, Incorporation, and Regulation Act of
1844, steadily expanded investor legal protection. Indeed, the committee
that drafted the 1844 act reﬂected long on past ﬁnancial crises and stock
market bubbles and “classiﬁed bubble companies into those naturally un-
sound, those unsound through bad management, and those clearly fraud-
ulent. For the ﬁrst nothing could be done, and for the others the great rem-
edy was publicity” (Frentrop 2003, p. 155). In contrast, civil law countries
typically responded to such crises by using banks or state investment pro-
grams to circumvent the stock market. Thus, Aganin and Volpin (chap. 6)
write that “in Italy, the government responded to the Great Depression by
becoming a substitute for capital markets. Post war [sic] governments saw
no great need to improve capital market regulation.” Most other continen-
tal European countries and Japan adopted similar policies. This reﬂects
the ﬁrst intrinsic diﬀerence between the two systems. Common-law coun-
tries’ courts and governments sought to protect the weak from the strong;
civil law countries’ governments sought alternative ways of implement-
ing the public-policy goal of eﬃcient capital allocation. Their courts, ill
equipped to restore faith in capital markets for the reasons outlined above,
let matters rest.
Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (chap. 10) write of higher standards of ethics
in British than in foreign businesses. This might reﬂect the second intrinsic
diﬀerence between common-law and civil code systems, the uncertainty in-
trinsic to common law. Precedent and general principle can convict wrong-
doers who rely overly on the letter of the law. Certainly, Becht and DeLong
(chap. 11) ascribe the diﬀusion of ownership to shareholder rights created
by activist common-law courts in the United States. Perhaps small in-
vestors in common-law countries factored in the probability of some prop-
erty rights protection despite an absence of statutory rights, and this sus-
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21. See, e.g., Markesinis (2000), and see also Posner (1996).
22. See also Weiss (2000) for the argument that diﬀerences, though perhaps overstated by
some scholars, exist and are important.tained their stock markets through rough patches. Sylla and Smith (1995)
argue that legal reforms in late nineteenth-century Britain could have per-
mitted this.
Enriques (2002) tracks Italian corporate judicial rulings through the late
1980s and 1990s and ﬁnds a bias in favor of corporate insiders and highly
formalistic arguments; but no evidence that judges consider the impact of
their rulings on the incentives or behavior of ﬁrms and managers. Aganin
and Volpin (chap. 6) refer to these ﬁndings, and to evidence in La Porta et
al. (1998) of the low quality of legal enforcement in Italy, to stress that
weak Italian corporate governance might reﬂect a poor-quality judicial
system rather than an absence of speciﬁc shareholder rights or a civil law
system per se. But the third intrinsic diﬀerence between common law and
civil codes points to judicial dysfunction in these speciﬁc areas of law,
which matter critically to the corporate governance of diﬀusely owned
ﬁrms, as special vulnerabilities of an ill-functioning civil code system.
Overall, the studies in this volume do not undermine the basic argument
that diﬀerences in legal systems matter. Indeed, de Jong and Röell (chap. 8)
present the only discussion of a discrete change in legal system, describing
how Napoleon’s imposition of his civil code on the Netherlands undid
much of its ﬁnancial development.23Frentrop (2003) conﬁrms much of this
in more detail. De Jong and Röell clarify the subsidiary importance of lists
of statutory shareholder rights and underscore the need to study more fun-
damental diﬀerences between legal systems. Eﬀective shareholder legal
protection takes more than a complete checklist of statutory provisions.
La Porta et al. (2004) and La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2005)
stress more fundamental legal system diﬀerences turning on judicial inde-
pendence, disclosure, and securities laws.
Origins
Much recent work posits that the institutional diﬀerences between mod-
ern countries derive, in part at least, from diﬀerences in their preindustrial
economies.24Tosome extent, these arguments are motivated by economet-
ric considerations. A truly exogenous variable is needed to resolve many of
the econometric issues that bedevil empirical economics, and where better
to ﬁnd one than in the distant past? But beneath these technical motiva-
tions there lies a genuine belief that past centuries’ events and conditions
constrain today’s decision makers and institution builders.
An extreme thesis of this sort is that economic development is predes-
tined by geography. This is an uncomfortable philosophy to economists, for
it diminishes somewhat their trade. Yet Diamond (1997) posits precisely
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23. Though Mokyr (2000) argues that Dutch laws and institutions needed serious reform at
this point anyway because heirs to its earlier economic success had become entrenched and
blocked further progress.
24. La Porta et al. (1997a) justify the exogeneity of legal origin on this basis.this.25Others, like Weber (1904) and Stulz and Williamson (2003), argue, in
a parallel vein, that deeply ingrained cultural factors predetermine eco-
nomic prosperity. Weber stresses the unique developments surrounding the
Protestant Reformation in Europe and argues that these prepared Europe
uniquely for free markets and rapid economic growth. True, the ﬁrst two
economic powerhouses of modern Europe, Britain and the Netherlands,
were resolutely Protestant, as were many principalities that became Ger-
many. The religious wars that swept Europe funneled educated refugees
and capital into the uniquely tolerant Netherlands as Dutch merchants in-
vented the joint-stock company. The English Civil War, which freed British
courts of royal oversight, certainly had a religious side—unﬁnished busi-
ness from the Reformation. But German industrial development occurred
long after the Reformation, and not much before similar bursts of growth
in Catholic Europe in the twentieth century. Högfeldt’s chapter on Sweden
describes decidedly oligarchic institutions given a modern social demo-
cratic sheen. And other Protestant countries, like the Baltic states, re-
mained outside the modern world until quite recently.
An alternate approach to predestination, more conducive to economic
analysis, is Haber’s (1999) argument that diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent
economic institutions—customs, cultures, and traditions as well as legal
systems—and that these institutions determine how people behave, and
hence what sorts of public and private investments are feasible.26Sound in-
stitutions protect private property rights, encourage the honest payment of
taxes, and enforce contractual agreements and other forms of cooperation.
In a sound institutional environment, large-scale public and private invest-
ment are made possible by freedom from the threats of theft, cheating, and
reneging. With varying qualiﬁcations, this situation characterizes today’s
developed economies. In particular, sound institutions of corporate gover-
nance permit the existence of large corporations and their ownership by
diﬀuse investors.
But an absence of sound institutions leads to diﬀerent arrangements.
Where the state and investors cannot rely on arm’s-length arrangements to
protect property rights, one must co-opt the other. To protect their prop-
erty rights, powerful individuals and families in such countries control the
police powers of the state. Or those who control the state appropriate what
wealth the economy has, invest it to beneﬁt themselves, and use their po-
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25. Diamond (1997) argues that the larger land mass of the Eurasia gave rise to more do-
mesticable plants and animals and that its primarily east-to-west orientation permitted their
rapid diﬀusion. This gave its inhabitants a permanent lead in the process of economic devel-
opment. Our problem with this thesis is that most domesticated plants and animals derive
from wild species. Ex post, the ancestors of wheat and cows must have been domesticable.
This does not mean New World species, like turkeys and potatoes, could not have been do-
mesticated earlier and more fully too. Who knows how good a beast of burden might have
been bred from, say, the plains bison?
26. This work builds upon Olson (1963, 1982) and others.lice power to protect their investments. Either solution frees investors from
the danger of losing to cheaters, thieves, and scoundrels. However, unsur-
prisingly, these oligarchs see little reason to protect the property rights of
others. This leads to oligarchic institutions—the governance of most eco-
nomic activity is entrusted to wealthy oligarchs who use the state to protect
their interests, and most of the population lives without meaningful prop-
erty rights or extensive public goods. Haber (1999) views Latin America as
typifying this form of economic organization.
Once oligarchic institutions are in place, oligarchs understandably pre-
fer the status quo and use the state to prevent institutions from changing.
Olson (1963), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001, 2002a,b), and Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2004) all
present mechanisms through which this can happen and which give rise to
a sort of economic predestination. Once a country has oligarchic institu-
tions, upending them is not easy.
Advanced non-Western economies, according to Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2002b), had well-developed indigenous institutions that
evolved to exploit natural resources for the beneﬁt of the local elite. Euro-
pean colonial rulers and postcolonial independence leaders retained these
oligarchic institutions, hampering broad-based economic development.
Consequently, the most advanced non-Western societies—Asia, the Is-
lamic world, Mexico, and Peru—have the most problems incorporating
modern Western institutions.
This certainly resonates with the chapter on China by Goetzmann and
Köll, which describes how the traditional Chinese imperial bureaucracy,
acting as it always had, undermined well-intentioned and carefully written
legal reforms aimed at establishing the institutions of good corporate gov-
ernance in late nineteenth-century China. In contrast, Japan, a much
younger civilization, whose local institutions were in disrepute at the time
of its opening to the West, managed a more successful transplant of West-
ern institutional arrangements.
The chapter on India ﬁts less fully with the thesis of Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson (2002a). Khanna and Palepu point to India’s ancient
precolonial mercantile traditions, carried into the modern world by spe-
ciﬁc ethnic minorities—especially the Marwari, Gujerati, and Parsi.
They document the close ties between India’s leading mercantile families
and both the British Raj and Congress party, and describe situations sim-
ilar to Haber’s (1999) depiction of Latin American oligarchic institutions
and in line with Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson. However, Khanna
and Palepu go on to describe how the Tata family, which was politically
close to the British colonial government, lost much of its political inﬂu-
ence after independence, and especially after India embraced Nehruvian
Socialism. The family’s response was an energetic entrepreneurial strat-
egy that worked around a mainly hostile License Raj and built up suﬃ-
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industry.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) argue that patterns of Euro-
pean settlement centuries ago determine modern economic institutions
and patterns of corporate control in the modern world. They argue that
where European settlers could survive, they created institutions that pro-
moted economic development, but that where they could not survive, they
created institutions that facilitated the fastest possible extraction of valu-
able resources. Those oligarchic institutions, once established, were locked
in, condemning the latter countries to centuries of poverty and exploita-
tion by colonial and then local elites.
The chapters on Canada, India, and the United States—all former
colonies—speak to this thesis. Those on Canada and the United States
document early institutions and institutional development not very diﬀer-
ent from those of their colonial masters, the British and French. Morck et
al. (chap. 1) make the point that Canada’s longer presettlement history as
a French, and then British, fur trade entrepôt gives it some institutional
echoes of a colony of resource extraction run in the interests of a tiny elite.
Clearly, colonial and traditional institutions do persist, and constrain sub-
sequent institutional development.
Evolution
But this argument can be pressed too far. European countries also have
their colonial origins. France was a Roman colony, and the French civil
code is essentially a revised version of the code Justinian applied to all parts
of the Roman Empire, including Gaul. The Romans adopted Greek ideas,
and the Greeks drew from Egypt. Modern European institutions of gov-
ernment, society, and law still echo ancient antecedents, but they have also
clearly evolved.
Institutions change—occasionally radically—dooming predestination
as a complete explanation of modern institutions. Olson (1982) argues that
major institutional changes require major disruptions, like wars or disas-
ters, which weaken the elite suﬃciently to interrupt its control of the state.
This certainly resonates with several of the chapters in this volume and
other work on the history of corporate governance. Frentrop (2003) argues
that the Dutch developed the ﬁrst joint-stock company, the Dutch East In-
dies Company, founded in 1602, to gain leverage against larger European
powers that threatened them.27 This company pioneered the use of share
certiﬁcates traded on a stock exchange to raise money. This freed the com-
pany from ﬁnancial dependence on a royal exchequer so that economic
logic, rather than court intrigue, might determine strategies. Its commer-
cial success catapulted the small Dutch Republic from obscurity to chal-
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27. See Frentrop (2003) for details.lenging the Spanish Empire, built on New World gold, and the Portuguese
domination of the circum-African spice trade. In the seventeenth century,
the British imported successful Dutch institutions along with the House
of Orange after the Glorious Revolution. In the nineteenth century, the
French, Germans, Italians, and Swedes—and even the Dutch—could all
look to Britain for model institutions when their own came into disrepute.
In the twentieth century, Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the
United States each took Britain’s place in diﬀerent decades, with decidedly
more mixed results.
The chapters in this book show that institutional change seems to re-
quire a crisis in existing institutions and a workable role model for new
ones. The Tokugawa shoguns lost face irreparably by capitulating to Ad-
miral Perry and opening Japan to American trade. This loss let the Meiji
leaders stage a coup and undertake wholesale changes to every aspect of
Japanese society. The American Revolution and the liberal rebellions in
1830s Canada also clearly reshaped institutions. But the ﬁnancial chaos of
the French Revolution, according to Murphy (chap. 3), helped induce in-
stitutions that delayed French ﬁnancial development. Good intentions are
certainly no guarantee of good results.
Most important to recent developments in corporate governance, the
Great Depression emerges in virtually every chapter as a key formative ex-
perience. In the United States, this crisis activated progressive political
forces that broke up America’s great pyramidal groups. But in Canada, it
triggered a return to old mercantilist traditions, as the government car-
telized the economy to ﬁght deﬂation. In Sweden, the Great Depression left
scores of ﬁrms bankrupt and the Wallenbergs’ bank holding control blocks
of their shares in lieu of debt repayments. In Germany, Italy, and Japan,
the Depression brought in extremist political movements, which subordi-
nated corporate governance to ideology.
Transplants
The histories recounted in this volume contain several instances of one
country deliberately adopting institutions developed in another. General-
izations from these few histories must be highly tentative. Nonetheless, a
few patterns stand out.
Transplants between Western countries seem healthier than those from
Western to non-Western countries. This might be because none of these
institutions was totally foreign to the importing country. Thus, the
Napoleonic code was successfully transplanted to the rest of continental
Europe, including the Netherlands. That most of Europe already used
variants of Roman civil law prepared the ground. Sweden adopted ﬁrst
Scottish and then German banking with little diﬃculty, but Swedes were
already quite familiar with each system beforehand. Canada borrowed
much of her securities laws from the United States, but many Canadians
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the United States.
Transplants to non-Western countries seem less robust. The chapter on
China describes a rejected transplant. In the late Qing dynasty, China’s en-
trenched bureaucrats could not comprehend the concept of independent
ﬁrms, as envisioned in its Westernized corporations law. The bureaucrats’
traditional concepts of patronage and loyalty congealed into endemic cor-
ruption that replaced Chinese capitalism with Soviet institutions. The
chapter on India describes how shoddy Soviet transplants also corroded
India’s British institutions after independence, though less completely. The
Japan chapter describes that country’s serial adoption of a sequence of for-
eign institutions.
All of these observations concur well with the transplant eﬀect proposed
by Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003) and Pistor et al. (2003, p. 81),
who argue that legal evolution is continuous and gradual in countries with
indigenously developed legal systems but that transplanted legal systems
stagnate for long periods, with interruptions of radical and even erratic
change. Pistor argues that transplanted legal systems that can adapt are
more likely to succeed. Without disputing this, Goetzmann and Köll
(chap. 2) propose that indigenous Chinese institutions undermined prom-
ising transplants. This raises the possibility that operational home-grown
institutions might marginalize or capture transplants, rendering them dys-
functional.
Large Outside Shareholders
Corporate governance is an important determinant of the distribution
of economic power, and thus a key plank of reform in many political ide-
ologies.
For example, the French Revolution probably injected an important ide-
ological element into European corporate governance. Dunlavy (2004) ar-
gues that many corporate shareholder meetings were radically more dem-
ocratic in the early nineteenth century than they are now. Many corporate
charters at that time granted one vote per shareholder, rather than one vote
per share, which Dunlavy calls plutocratic voting. Others had scaled voting
rights systems, which granted larger shareholders fewer votes per share or
capped their voting rights. The one-vote-per-shareholder system may have
reﬂected common legal rules governing business and municipal corpora-
tions. However, such voting systems were by no means universal in the
early history of capitalism. For example, the 1670 charter of the Hudson’s
Bay Company provided for one vote per share, not one vote per share-
holder. Dunlavy reports that plutocratic voting rapidly came to dominate
American shareholder meetings but that more democratic shareholder
meetings persisted through much of the nineteenth century on the Euro-
pean continent.
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tained the popularity of one-vote-per-shareholder corporate governance
on the continent. Certainly, Frentrop (2003) argues that “the ideal of
equality promulgated by the French Revolution made the shareholders’
meeting, which provided equal rights for all shareholders, the most power-
ful body of the company. This was so self-evident that Napoleon’s 1807
Code de Commerce does not mention it. Directors were dismissible agents
of the shareholders.”
An alternative explanation, proposed by de Jong and Röell (chap. 8) in
connection with the Netherlands, is that corporate insiders limited the vot-
ing power of large outside shareholders to entrench themselves. Certainly,
both explanations could be true. Corporate insiders might have cynically
exploited popular ideologies to lock in their control rights. Or they might
have genuinely subscribed to ideologies that coincidentally entrenched
their economic power.
Rajan and Zingales (2003) advance the former thesis to explain why the
ﬁnancial systems of many countries atrophied during the twentieth cen-
tury. They show that many countries had much larger and more developed
ﬁnancial systems at the beginning of the century than at the end of the cold
war era. They propose that a ﬁrst generation of entrepreneurs raised
money to ﬁnance industrialization at the beginning of the century and that
they or their heirs lobbied for government policies that crippled their coun-
tries’ ﬁnancial systems to prevent competitors from raising capital. One
way to do this is to support high income taxes and low estate taxes. An-
other might be checks on the voting power of large outside shareholders,
which might have been an ideologically acceptable way to do this.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997) argue that large outside shareholders,
by rendering takeovers credible threats, cause corporate managers in the
United States to work harder, and that this raises share prices for small in-
vestors. Weakening large outside shareholders would entrench existing in-
siders by stopping takeovers and would make stocks less attractive to small
investors, depriving potential entrants of capital.
However, large outside shareholders may have interests of their own that
mesh poorly with small shareholders’ interests. Corporate pension funds
might be reined in by corporate management to invite reciprocal treatment
from their counterparts’ pension funds. Public-sector pension funds might
be subject to political inﬂuence. Nonetheless, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi
(chap. 10) argue that institutional investors were clearly a force for good
governance in the United Kingdom. Perhaps they are set to play similar
roles elsewhere too.
Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2002) stress ﬁnding a balance between mana-
gerial discretion and small shareholder protection. Systems that lean too
far toward protecting small shareholders from blockholders let existing
corporate insiders do as they like because small shareholders lack the re-
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blockholders exposes shareholders to expropriation and perhaps also sub-
jects managers to unwarranted monitoring.
Financial Development
In a historical study of German universal banks, Kleeberg (1987, p. 112)
remarks that “the best advice for a young German industrialist who needed
more capital was to marry a rich wife . . . this was the advice which the
cologne merchant Friedrich Sölling constantly pressed upon his partner
Adolf Krupp. Hence the extremely complicated family trees and numerous
intermarriages among the Rhenish Bourgeoisie, grown rich oﬀ trade.”
Schumpeter (1912) puts less faith in entrepreneurs’ ability to procure ad-
vantageous marriages. He argues that the social purpose of ﬁnancial mar-
kets and institutions is to put capital in the hands of people with econom-
ically viable business plans, and that technology-driven growth is very
diﬃcult without tandem ﬁnancial development. Consistent with this, King
and Levine (1993) show that countries with better-developed stock mar-
kets and banking systems continually reallocate capital to ﬁnance vision-
ary entrepreneurs and thereby grow faster. The studies in this volume
largely support King and Levine.
Energetic stock markets are associated with the entry of new ﬁrms and
corporate governance entrusted to new entrepreneurs. Sleepy stock mar-
kets are associated with a freezing of cast. Morck et al. (chap. 1) show that
Canadian stock market booms correspond to periods of energetic entre-
preneurial activity. Aganin and Volpin (chap. 6) stress the importance of
Italy’s stock markets a century ago in ﬁnancing her ﬁrst generation of great
industrial corporate groups. Högfeldt (chap. 9) argues that Sweden’s so-
cialist governments weakened her ﬁnancial system, locking a corporate
elite in place, and that this ultimately retarded economic growth. Rajan
and Zingales (2003) argue that yesterday’s entrepreneurs often lobby to
weaken ﬁnancial markets as a way to deter competitors from arising. While
none of the studies in this volume reports direct evidence of such lobbying,
the argument is plausible. To distort Mark Twain only slightly, “The radi-
cal of one century is the conservative of the next.”
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) argue that active stock markets aﬀect cor-
porate governance by letting wealthy heirs sell out, and this is conﬁrmed in
several chapters. Becht and DeLong (chap. 11) describe how American
stock markets deepened and broadened to ﬁnance ﬁrst railways and then
industrial ﬁrms too. This permitted trust promoters to ﬂoat shares to buy
out founders or their heirs in a wave of takeovers. Other American families
sold out incompletely, keeping a tenuous grip on their companies with
relatively small ownership stakes or board seats. Morck et al. (chap. 1)
describe similar events in Canada. Aganin and Volpin (chap. 6) describe a
boom on the Milan Stock Exchange at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
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numerous entrepreneurs raise capital by selling shares on the stock market.
They go on to note that, by 1907, 72 percent of the total equity of all Ital-
ian limited-liability ﬁrms traded on stock markets.
Irrational exuberance in America’s stock markets may also have helped
disperse corporate ownership in that country. Becht and DeLong (chap.
11) echo Dewing (1919) and argue that the American stock market gave
founders and heirs the chance to sell their stock for more than it was worth.
“Physicians, teachers, dentists, and clergymen” constituted “the happy
hunting ground” of the “sucker list,” where people were persuaded to buy
“highly speculative and worthless securities” by “devious and dubious”
methods. Stock market booms in other countries may have played similar
roles. Morck et al. (chap. 1) describe Canadian families selling out into the
overheated market of the late 1920s and a consequent increase in the im-
portance of widely held ﬁrms.
Where shareholders’ property rights are insecure, trust commands a pre-
mium. Becht and DeLong (chap. 11) argue that American shareholders at
the beginning of the twentieth century had “virtually no statutory legal
rights, and so favored companies controlled by men of good repute and ac-
complishment, such as J. P. Morgan and his partners, who charged hand-
somely for monitoring services.” Under these circumstances, stock mar-
kets expand the governance sway of established families. Pagano, Panetta,
and Zingales (1998) report that, from 1983 through 1989, the number of
listings on the Milan stock market grew more than 50 percent, but that
most of the new listings were subsidiaries of traded companies going public
to take advantage of booming stock markets. Khanna and Palepu (chap. 5)
point to similar developments in postindependence India and argue that
established families backed entrepreneurs by helping them build listed
companies within established family pyramidal groups.
Where stock markets are ill trusted, banks can channel ﬁnancing to en-
trepreneurs and monitor corporate governance. However, this seems to
have played an important role in only a few countries. The chapters on
Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands highlight how commercial banks in
those countries entered the era of industrialization with strong attach-
ments to the real bills doctrine, which mandated that banks lend with trade
goods as collateral. This let banks enthusiastically fund trade but kept
them from ﬁnancing industrial plant and equipment. Branch banking re-
strictions and the Glass Steagall Act of 1933 kept American commercial
banks to a minimal role in ﬁnancing large corporations. Memory of the
Crédit Mobilier ﬁasco apparently kept British banks out of investment
banking too. In contrast, German, Japanese, and (later) Swedish banks ea-
gerly ﬁnanced industrial development. In the case of Japanese banks, this
was despite an analog of Glass Steagall imposed by Macarthur in the post-
war period.
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phisticated monitors of corporate insiders and thus reliable guarantors of
good corporate governance. However,  Morck and Nakamura (1999),
Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000), and others argue that bankers’
aim in governance oversight is to make sure corporate borrowers repay
their debts. This could induce excessive risk aversion and excessive invest-
ment in tangible collateralizable assets, rather than knowledge-based as-
sets. Banks and other ﬁnancial ﬁrms are also biased as monitors of corpo-
rate governance because they see ﬁrms as customers too. De Jong and
Röell (chap. 8) make this point succinctly, quoting an insurance company
representative thus: “You are in a diﬃcult position if you want to present a
new contract to the management board whilst you have voted against one
of their proposals the day before.”28
Fohlin (chap. 4) argues that German banks’ contribution to corporate
governance is often overstated. Kleeberg (1987, p. 134) agrees, noting that
“German industrialization advanced rapidly in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, but probably depended more on old family wealth than on bank
loans.” Where bank ﬁnancing was important, he questions its economic
eﬀects, noting (p. 404) that “an unfortunate result has been that often the
most successful captains of industry in Germany have not had any partic-
ular talent for industry or marketing, but rather were skilled at handling
the banks.”
Finally, this volume makes it clear that ﬁnancial development is not a
given but depends on politics and history. China’s ﬁrst attempt to develop
a modern ﬁnancial system was a serious initiative that ran afoul of her an-
cient entrenched bureaucracy. Murphy (chap. 3) argues that France’s train
of ﬁnancial crises made her people leery of capital markets and induced her
politicians to overregulate them. Pointing to a constricted ﬁnancial system
as an explanation for highly concentrated corporate governance is inade-
quate,for this begs the question of why a country’s ﬁnancial system is what
it is. Chapters 10 and 11 show how politicians responsive to demands by in-
vestors made the ﬁnancial systems of the United States and United King-
dom, respectively, what they are.
Politics
The studies in this volume are unenthusiastic about direct political in-
volvement in corporate governance. But they also testify to the importance
of government in establishing and sustaining the legal and regulatory in-
frastructure needed for sustained good governance.
From a historical perspective, entrusting corporate governance to the
state evokes the Axis powers’ policies in the 1930s and 1940s, described in
this volume by Aganin and Volpin (chap. 6), Fohlin (chap. 4), and Morck
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28. D. Brilleslijper, Delta Lloyd spokesman, in FEM Business, 20 September 2003.and Nakamura (chap. 7). While the forms of private ownership survived,
eﬀective control rested with party and military representatives on boards.
From a theoretical viewpoint, Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) argue
that state control leads to excessive employment. Krueger (1990) argues
that political patronage inﬂicts inferior governance on state-owned enter-
prises. Consistent with this, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cantly depressed proﬁtability in state-owned enterprises.
One state role in corporate governance that has not yet attracted much
attention from researchers is the pyramidal group of listed companies with
a state-owned enterprise at the apex. Aganin and Volpin (chap. 6) argue
that the “wasting of resources” by state-controlled pyramidal groups of
listed companies in Italy was an important cause of that country’s eco-
nomic crisis in the 1990s. Morck et al. (chap. 1) refer to scandalous gover-
nance problems at the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec, a provin-
cially controlled pyramidal group in Canada. Further work is needed to
clarify the political purposes of these structures and to understand better
their governance and economic impact.
Despite their skepticism about direct political involvement in corporate
decisions, many contributors stress the power of the state to despoil or dis-
tort corporate governance. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that the stock
market can be either fostered or hampered by government action, depend-
ing on the balance of powers between pressure groups. Khanna and Palepu
(chap. 5) describe the License Raj as a “Kafkaesque maze of controls [hav-
ing] more to do with a heady fascination with the intellectual cuisine of the
London School of Economics and Cambridge . . . and the wonder of the
then ascendant Soviet planning machine, than with the actions of India’s
dominant family businesses. Business groups had to either manipulate it,
as some did, or invent themselves around it, as did others.” Aganin and
Volpin (chap. 6) likewise stress the role of politics in Italian corporate gov-
ernance through the century.
Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) argue that business families control busi-
ness groups to extract personal gains and attain their position through di-
rectly unproductive economic activities and through their inﬂuence over
government policies and actions.29 Pagano and Volpin (2001) and Biais
and Perotti (2003) argue that state intervention in the economy should be
negatively correlated with ﬁnancial development, because the state acts as
a substitute for ﬁnancial markets. Högfeldt (chap. 9) proposes a similar
history in Sweden, where the Social Democrats let the ﬁnancial system
wither like an unnecessary appendix. Aganin and Volpin (chap. 6) emphasize
how little Italian stock markets mattered mid-century, noting that “from
1950 to 1980, between 15 and 20 percent of traded companies in Italy were
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and assemble a range of empirical evidence about their scope of applicability.controlled by the government. The correlation between the two series is –70
percent.”
Entrenchment
Finally, the studies in this volume all point to a commonality in human
nature. Elites are self-interested and cooperate to entrench themselves—
even at considerable cost to their economies and to themselves in forgone
opportunities to grow richer. Becht and DeLong (chap. 11) explain how
American controlling shareholders and professional managers took control
of the board nomination process to all but give themselves ironclad tenure.
Morck and Nakamura (chap. 7) describe how the builders of Japanese zai-
batsu family pyramids viewed those structures as devices to lock in control,
and how postwar keiretsu groups developed to block hostile takeovers that
threatened corporate insiders’ positions. De Jong and Röell (chap. 11) ar-
gue that Dutch corporate insiders developed an array of oligarchic devices
to limit shareholders’ power to ﬁre them. Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (chap.
10) describe how British corporate insiders tried unsuccessfully to erect py-
ramidal business groups to similarly entrench a status quo that bestowed
privileges upon them. Fohlin (chap. 4) depicts German banks safeguarding
their control of corporate proxy voting to entrench the power of leading
bankers. Aganin and Volpin (chap. 6) relate how elite Italian business fam-
ilies entrenched themselves. Chapters 2, 3, 5, and 9 describe bureaucrats de-
stroying wealth to lock in their power. In the case of Sweden, Högfeldt ar-
gues that wealthy families ultimately cooperated with public oﬃcials in a
sort of “mutual entrenchment” pact. Mody argues, in his discussion of the
chapter on India, that a similar conﬂuence of self-interest occurred in India,
and Morck et al. (chap. 1) speculate that something analogous might have
happened in Canada in the latter twentieth century.
A predisposition to invest in entrenching one’s position is consistent
with recent research into the nature of self-interest. Prospect theory, pro-
posed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), holds that individuals view up-
side and downside risk asymmetrically. A preponderance of empirical and
experimental work, surveyed by Shleifer (2000), now supports prospect
theory as representative of typical human behavior.
Prospect theory makes people loss averse. That is, people typically place
a higher subjective value on avoiding a $100 loss than on gaining $100 of
additional wealth.
In this light, pervasive entrenchment seems almost inevitable. For en-
trenchment is precisely about sacriﬁcing opportunities for further gain to
minimize the risk of loss—archetypical self-interested behavior according
to prospect theory. The patriarch of a large family ﬁrm can either support
or oppose institutional reforms, such as more eﬃcient capital markets or
courts. These changes might let the patriarch greatly expand his family
business group and grow much wealthier, but they also might let competi-
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Large risks of this sort, according to prospect theory, are typically rejected
even if they entail substantial upside potential. Risking the patrimony is
simply unacceptable. In contrast, minor tinkering with institutional
change is typically acceptable. Prospect theory thus suggests a conserva-
tive bias that would encourage wealthy patriarchs to invest in entrenching
themselves and oppose institutional reform that might risk their current
wealth and status. If political power is largely in the hands of the currently
wealthy, Kuran (1988) predicts a locking in of the status quo. Olson (1963,
1982) suggests that this is likely to be the case, as does Faccio (2003).
But ordinary citizens might also entertain a bias against institutional re-
form. Murphy (chap. 3) shows how various attempts to reform the French
ﬁnancial system led to repeated disaster. If most people view institutional
change as carrying a substantial probability of making things worse, pop-
ulations as a whole might likewise favor the status quo.
Another key element of human nature, ﬁrst demonstrated in experi-
mental work by Milgram (1963, 1983), is an apparently reﬂexive obedience
to perceived legitimate authority.30 It seems likely that this behavioral re-
sponse stabilizes family capitalism throughout much of the world, espe-
cially where wealthy families who control large business groups are closely
intertwined with the state and so have reinforced legitimacy.
Third, the economy requires a degree of institutional stability. Com-
mons (1924) argues correctly that business planning is impossible if criti-
cal institutions are uncertain. Business is often easier with certain but un-
favorable laws than with uncertain favorable laws. Owen and Braeutigam
(1978) argue in this vein that people holding uncompleted contracts per-
ceive themselves as having a right to the continuation of existing institu-
tions, and so oppose change.
All of this might explain the one-sided institutional momentum that is
evident throughout the studies in this volume. Institutional reform that
locks in the status quo seems easy. Institutional reform that brings real
change is rare. China’s ﬁrst attempt to import Western legal institutions
failed because it threatened the powers of her ancient bureaucracy. The re-
forms were either ignored or modiﬁed to protect the bureaucrats, and so
they failed to bring sustainable free enterprise to China. America’s attempt
to impose freestanding widely held ﬁrms on postwar Japan likewise failed
because their professional managers saw their status at risk because of
threatened hostile takeovers. Those managers reconstituted corporate
groups to lock in the status quo. India’s License Raj, Sweden’s Social
Democracy, and perhaps Canada’s post-1960s Statism were all arguably
attempts at radical reform of various sorts that ultimately entrenched cor-
porate elite families.
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cause people thought they had little more to lose given the disaster of the
Great Depression. A small loss balanced against a large gain can induce
people to take the bet and support institutional change. In America, they
apparently won. Similar willingness to bet in 1930s Germany, Italy, and
Japan turned out less happily.
Prospect theory is not the only possible underpinning for a conserva-
tive bias against institutional change. Roe (1996) argues that institutions
might suﬀer from a QWERTY eﬀect, whereby institutions, like keyboards
with which everyone is familiar, are retained because the cost of adjusting
to new ways exceeds the beneﬁt—at least in the short term.31 Day (1987),
Heiner (1983, 1986, 1988), and others argue for a conservative bias based
on bounded rationality and computation costs.
All of this has several implications. First, real institutional change is
diﬃcult, but not impossible. Overcoming a popular conservative bias is
easiest during crises, when people feel they have less to lose should the re-
formgo wrong. Second, countries will not easily mimic each other, so vari-
ation in institutions across countries with diﬀerent histories will not dis-
appear easily—even if one system appears better. Third, institutional
change, even when implemented enthusiastically from above, as in pre-
communist China, may fail because of a popular conservative bias. Insti-
tutions that sustain great ineﬃciency, inequality, and even corruption may
thus be quite historically stable.
Conclusions
History, like poetry, does not repeat itself, but rhymes. Accidents of his-
tory give the rhyme a diﬀerent starting point in diﬀerent countries, but
there is a common meter throughout.
Financial disasters tainted French conﬁdence in ﬁnancial securities
early on and set corporate governance in that country on a diﬀerent path
from that of Britain, where similar trauma was overcome and forgotten.
Why trauma desolates some people and some nations, while others pick up
the pieces and move on, is profoundly unclear. But history is more than a
string of accidental traumas.
Ideas matter. There is a conservative bias in every country that impedes
institutional change. But when crisis strikes, that bias lessens and change is
possible. Whatever idea is waiting in the wings at that time can be swept
into reality. Thus, American Progressivism, German National Socialism,
Italian Fascism, Japanese militarism, and Swedish Social Democracy all
became incarnate during the depressions of the 1920s and 1930s.
Families matter. Throughout the world, big business was, at ﬁrst, family
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31. Though see David (1985).business. It seems likely this arose because blood kin can cooperate more
reliably than nonkin. Reliable cooperation is important in countries at
early stages in their economic development, when legal and regulatory in-
stitutions are unreliable guarantors of trustworthy behavior. But this, too,
is admittedly speculation. For families remain overwhelmingly important
in the governance of the large business sectors of all but a handful of de-
veloped economies. Perhaps this reﬂects a conservative bias against
change, or perhaps many developed countries still do not have institutions
that foster an ambient trust. Or perhaps there are other explanations, like
inherited talent, that we ﬁnd intellectually uncomfortable.
Business groups, each encompassing many separately listed ﬁrms, be-
came important in almost every country, including the United States, at
some point, and they remain important in most developed economies.
These groups almost always have a pyramidal structure, with a family, fam-
ily partnership, or family trust at the apex. To some extent, these structures
were probably hierarchical arrangements designed to span dysfunctional
markets in the early stages of economic development, and these explana-
tions perhaps retain validity in modern emerging economies. But the ubiq-
uity of large pyramidal family-controlled business groups in Canada,
Japan, and most of Western Europe is harder to square with this theory.
Those countries have had many decades of high income and could surely
have repaired such problems had they wanted to. It seems likely that py-
ramidal business groups of listed companies survive in wealthy countries
because they lock in the corporate governance power of an elite family over
capital assets worth far more than the family fortune. That power brings
intangible beneﬁts that such families are loath to surrender.
Wealthy families, to lock in their corporate governance, might block the
emergence of trustworthy markets and institutions, and so greatly harm
their countries. Or they might persist as a sort of corporate governance ap-
pendix while institutions and markets develop around them. Or, like con-
stitutional monarchs, they might serve shareholders by providing consti-
tutional guarantees of good governance, and so contribute to higher levels
of trust. Or might business acumen sometimes actually pass down through
families? Each possibility was probably realized at diﬀerent times and in
diﬀerent countries.
Law clearly matters, though just how is less than clear. Many current
diﬀerences between common-law and civil law countries regarding statu-
tory shareholder rights are not long-standing diﬀerences.32 This volume
advances our understanding of the diﬀerent manifestations of capitalism
throughout the world. By adopting a historical approach it provides useful
insights into how various economic institutions, and institutional conﬁgu-
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32. See Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2004) regarding the dearth of shareholder rights in the
pre-Depression United States.rations, came to be. It also engenders some general observation regarding
varieties of capitalism and economic change.
Legal systems are not the only features that distinguish former Western
colonies from each other. Perhaps vestiges of indigenous institutions
mount an immune response against transplanted Western institutions. Or
perhaps radical changes in institutions invite problems. Patterns in current
corporate governance sometimes attributed to legal system origins may re-
ﬂect other historical antecedents.
Institutions in every country studied evolved through time, and corpo-
rate control changed with them. What caused what is often unclear,
though. Many countries now considered to have highly trustworthy insti-
tutions, including institutions of corporate governance, were profoundly
corrupt only a few generations ago. There seems to have been an evolution
toward ever less popular tolerance of corrupt elites everywhere, except per-
haps in Britain.
Where reformers sought to hasten that evolution by transplanting insti-
tutions from one country to another, success has varied. Although West-
ern institutions grafted onto Japan quickly took on a native appearance,
the grafts surely did not fail. Japan is a highly prosperous economy, and few
countries are so devoid of governance and other scandals as to denounce
its institutional experimentation as a failure. Western institutions grafted
onto prerevolutionary China failed spectacularly, and those grafted onto
India long looked sickly but recently seem invigorated.
Large outside investors, such as pension funds, are becoming important
throughout the world and may well have a salubrious eﬀect on corporate
governance everywhere. However, it is hard to see how success in inﬂuenc-
ing the professional managers of widely held ﬁrms in the United Kingdom
or United States need imply similar success in inﬂuencing old moneyed
families with control blocks in scores of ﬁrms in a more typical country. Yet
wonders happen.
Financial development seems intimately tied to corporate governance,
with more developed ﬁnancial systems associated with more professional
management, more diﬀuse shareholders, and less ubiquitous family con-
trol. But these correlations are only rough, and many counterexamples
arose in the histories of many countries. For example, family groups rose
and fell in importance in Italy, while ﬁnancial development fell and then
rose—consistent with the general cross-country pattern. But family
groups fell and then rose in importance in Canada, while ﬁnancial devel-
opment probably mainly rose.
Politics perhaps explains some of this, for large family groups may be
better at dealing with more interventionist governments than multitudi-
nous freestanding ﬁrms. Or politicians bent on interventionism may value
being able to inﬂuence the whole corporate sector with phone calls to a
handful of patriarchs.
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tutions, including those that pertain to corporate governance, seem hard to
change, except to lock in more solidly the status quo at any point in time.
A common theme through all the countries surveyed is entrenchment—
corporate insiders modifying the rules to minimize the chances of becom-
ing outsiders. This is so ubiquitous that we propose that something basic in
human nature must be involved.
An ultimate bottom line for this volume is that history is best enjoyed vi-
cariously. Institutional change and, even worse, experimentation, though
enlivening the studies in this volume, have often been disastrous to those
involved. This too may explain the institutional momentum apparent in
every country. Certainly, it cautions against overly optimistic plans for top-
down structural reforms to corporate governance in developing countries.
But successful reforms dot history, and Japan’s wholesale transplanting of
Western institutions can scarcely be called a failure. History need not be
the handmaiden of authority.
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